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HIDDEN PRIORS: TOWARD A UNIFYING THEORY OF
SYSTEMIC DISPARATE TREATMENT LAW
JASON R. BENTt
ABSTRACT
Did the Court's procedural decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes undermine the substance of the systemic disparate treatment theo-
ry of employment discrimination? The answer to that question hinges on
understanding the theoretical foundation for what one scholar calls the
"most potent and least understood of the various Title VII causes of ac-
tion." The current scholarly efforts to understand systemic disparate
treatment law can be sorted into two distinct strands-methodological
and contextualist. Scholars in the methodological strand question wheth-
er statistical techniques currently used by courts are sufficient to support
an inference of discrimination. In the contextualist strand, scholars urge a
conceptual expansion of the systemic disparate treatment theory that
would impose liability on employers for wrongdoing located at the or-
ganizational level, rather than simply aggregating individual-level
claims. These two strands have advanced independently, with scholars in
each strand often overlooking the implications of progression in the oth-
er. This Article is the first attempt to unify these two scholarly strands. It
does so by exposing the inescapable role of hidden Bayesian priors-
preconceptions about background rates of discrimination-in the inter-
pretation of statistical evidence. Taking a Bayesian view, the shortcom-
ings of traditional statistical evidence identified by methodologists are
not fatal. Yet, the Bayesian view also provides the conceptual space
needed for further development of the organizational approach advanced
by contextualists. The Wal-Mart decision presents an opportunity to rad-
ically rethink this misunderstood area of antidiscrimination law, and this
Article takes the first step in developing of a coherent theory of systemic
disparate treatment that embraces Bayesian priors.
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INTRODUCTION
What, if anything, remains of the systemic disparate treatment theo-
ry of employment discrimination? This question is raised by the Supreme
Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.' Although Wal-Mart
was ostensibly a procedural case about the commonality requirement for
class certification, the opinion will have important, if deeply uncertain,
implications for the substantive law of systemic disparate treatment.2
Several scholars have questioned whether, as a practical matter, the theo-
ry survives Wal-Mart at all. 3 One thing is certain: systemic disparate
I. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2. See Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 395, 397 (2011) ("But the Court did more than pull the procedural rug out from
under the decade-long lawsuit; it called into question the future of systemic disparate treatment
law."); see also Noah D. Zatz, Introduction: Working Group on the Future of Systemic Disparate
Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 387, 387 (2011) ("Although Wal-Mart formally is a
case about class certification, the procedural analysis takes shape in the shadow of the substantive
theory of liability.").
3. See Green, supra note 2, at 397-98; L. Camille Hbert, The Supreme Court's 2010-2011
Labor and Employment Law Decisions. A Large and "Mixed Bag "for Employers and Employees,
15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 279, 309 (2011); Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, The Hazards of
Dukes: The Substantive Consequences of a Procedural Decision, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 123, 137
(2012). Professor Pedersen states:
The majority has rewritten the systemic disparate treatment standard to require some type
of corporate policy calling for the use of discrimination by its supervisors or else discrim-
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treatment law now sits at a historic crossroads.4 Whether it survives, and
in what form, depends on the articulation of a coherent theory of system-
ic disparate treatment that advances the remedial goals of antidiscrimina-
tion law without overstating the probative reach of statistical evidence of
observed disparities in employment outcomes.5
The scholarship on systemic disparate treatment discrimination has,
thus far, been unable to articulate such a coherent theory. Rather, the
discourse has diverged into two separate analytical strands each focusing
on a distinct aspect of systemic disparate treatment law. In the first
strand, which can be described as the methodological strand, scholars
question the ability of current statistical methodologies to support an
inference of unlawful discrimination based only on observed quantitative
disparities in employment outcomes.6 In the second strand, which may be
called the contextualist strand, scholars argue that the systemic disparate
treatment theory should be conceptually expanded to impose liability on
employers for wrongdoing located at the organizational level, rather than
simply functioning as a narrow doctrinal tool for aggregating individual-
inatory acts of one supervisor that reach an entire class of plaintiffs and can be held to
constitute a pattern or practice. Neither seems very viable.
Pedersen, supra, at 137 (footnote omitted); see also Zatz, supra note 2, at 387 ("Now Wal-Mart
threatens to turn that avenue into a dead end, in part by extending to Title VII this Court's general
hostility to the class action device." (footnote omitted)); Michael J. Zimmer, Wal-Mart v. Dukes:
Taking the Protection out of Protected Classes, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 409, 457 (2012) ("If
taken seriously, that interpretation of Wal-Mart would eliminate most systemic disparate treatment
pattern or practice cases."); Charles A. Sullivan, Maybe Systemic Disparate Treatment Isn't Dead
Yet?, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG (Dec. 10, 2012),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof-blog/2012/12/maybe-systemic-disparate-treatment-isnt-
dead-yet.html. But see Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v.
Wal-Martfor Cases Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
433, 434-35 (2012) (analyzing lower "court opinions from 2005 to mid-201 I" and questioning
whether the Wal-Mart opinion will have a significant practical effect on lawsuits "challenging sub-
jective employment practices").
4. In recognition of this, a group of scholars led by Professors Tristin Green and Noah Zatz
recently organized a Working Group on the Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law (Working
Group). The stated purpose of the Working Group was to consider what exactly the substantive law
of systemic disparate treatment means and to "get a head start on thinking about the post-Wal-Mart
landscape." See Zatz, supra note 2, at 387-88. The Working Group's work was published in Volume
32 of the Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law. See id. at 388; Richard Thompson Ford,
Beyond Good and Evil in Civil Rights Law: The Case ofWal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 513, 513 (2011); Green, supra note 2, at 398-99 (advancing "a 'context' model of organi-
zational wrongdoing" and direct liability as superior to models focused on identifying individual
instances of discrimination); Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 455, 457-58 (2011); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 481 (2011) (arguing that a statistical
showing alone is no longer sufficient to establish a systemic disparate treatment claim and that "it is
incumbent upon plaintiffs to explain the story the statistical presentation is telling").
5. See Green, supra note 2, at 454 (calling for an "open and frank debate about the theoreti-
cal grounding for and shape of systemic disparate treatment law"); Zatz, supra note 2, at 391 ("What
systemic disparate treatment theory needs is an account that grounds employer liability in firm-level
conduct-the connective tissue-[]not simply in dispersed individual disparate treatment, and does
so without relying exclusively on the extreme case of connective disparate treatment." (emphasis
omitted)).
6. See infra Part II.A.
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level claims of wrongdoing.7 Although there is significant tension be-
tween these two strands of scholarship, authors writing in each strand
rarely engage the key arguments or insights developed in the other. As a
result, courts are left without a coherent theory to make sense of a per-
plexing subject lying at the intersection of antidiscrimination law and
statistical theory. This Article is the first attempt to reconcile the key
differences between the methodologists and the contextualists and repre-
sents the first step in developing a unified theory of systemic disparate
treatment.
The path forward for systemic disparate treatment theory post-Wal-
Mart requires acknowledging the role of Bayesian priors-
preconceptions about background rates of employment discrimination.
8
At present, the Bayesian priors held by judges and juries in systemic
discrimination cases are obscured beneath a veneer of formalistic legal
reasoning.9 But these hidden priors operate nonetheless, invisibly affect-
ing the outcome of all systemic disparate treatment cases.'0 As this Arti-
cle will demonstrate, hidden priors can be located in the formative cases
that defined systemic disparate treatment theory in the late 1970s," as
well as in the Court's recent Wal-Mart decision, which threatens to se-
verely limit the theory.12
The objective of this Article is to develop a unifying path forward
for systemic disparate treatment law by exposing the inescapable opera-
tion of hidden Bayesian priors. The Article urges courts to openly
acknowledge the undeniable role of Bayesian priors in systemic disparate
treatment litigation and further urges scholars and courts to take up the
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. As the concept is used in this Article, a Bayesian prior is generally a pre-formed or pre-
conceived estimate of the likelihood that any given employer engaged in unlawful employment
discrimination, made before considering any given piece of additional information. Bayesian priors
may be used in an iterative fashion, such that the "prior probability" is informed by general precon-
ceptions about background rates, as updated by a cumulative assessment of all the nonstatistical
evidence in the case, but before considering the purely statistical evidence. See infra Part III.A.
9. See Deborah M. Weiss, The Impossibility ofAgnostic Discrimination Law, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 1677, 1741 (2011) (observing that both the majority opinion and the dissent in Wal-Mart
"clearly turn on background assumptions that are not well-grounded in evidence").
10. See id. at 1701 ("[J]uries enter the courtroom with pre-existing views about the societal
pattern of discrimination and cannot be forced by the fiat of evidentiary exclusion to turn off their
views about that societal pattern."). Judge Richard Posner xplains that Bayesian priors can operate
at an unconscious level, using discrimination cases as an example. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How
JUDGES THINK 67-68 (2008) ("I used the example of a sex discrimination suit because it is the kind
of suit in which judges' priors are likely to differ along political lines or along racial, religious, or
gender lines that are correlated with (and often influence) political leanings, or because of different
personal or professional experiences or differences in personality.").
11. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 300 (1977); Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977). Teamsters is generally considered the seminal case
on systemic disparate treatment theory. See, e.g., I CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.01, at 145 (3d ed. 2002); David G. Karro, Common Sense
About Common Claims, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L.J. 33, 45 (2007) (calling Teamsters "the
seminal pattem-or-practice case").
12. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); see also Weiss, supra note 9, at
1740-41.
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difficult challenges posed by recognizing the operation of priors. This
Article will be the first step in the development of a unified theory of
systemic disparate treatment employment discrimination. Embracing
priors will open up several challenging questions and new lines of schol-
arly inquiry about the proper management of priors in antidiscrimination
legislation and litigation. As just one example of these challenging ques-
tions: whose priors should be determinative?13 This Article will highlight
some of these second-order questions and frame the future debate over
such questions. A related article includes my own suggestions for the
proper management of priors in employment discrimination law.14 The
point of this Article, however, is to convince courts and scholars that
priors operate even when they are hidden or overlooked-meaning that
difficult questions about the management of priors should be openly de-
bated rather than simply ignored.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief introduc-
tion to the systemic disparate treatment theory, including an examination
of its foundational cases. Part II illustrates the critical juncture at which
systemic disparate treatment law now sits, exploring the two divergent
strands of legal scholarship on systemic disparate treatment theory and
the potential substantive implications of the Wal-Mart decision. Part III
lays out the Bayesian path toward a unified theory of systemic disparate
treatment law by bringing hidden priors into clear focus. Part IV briefly
identifies some of the difficult second-order questions regarding the
management of priors and lays out a scholarly agenda for addressing
those questions.
I. THE FOUNDATION OF SYSTEMIC DISPARATE TREATMENT LAW
To discern what remains of systemic disparate treatment law, we
must first examine the theory's origins. Professor Michael Selmi, in his
insightful contribution to the Working Group on the Future of Systemic
Disparate Treatment Law (Working Group), aptly described the systemic
disparate treatment theory as the "most potent and least understood of the
various Title VII causes of action."'15 Professor Selmi, along with Profes-
sor Tristin Green, was no doubt correct in characterizing systemic dis-
parate treatment law as "under-theorized."'16 Indeed, systemic disparate
treatment law has been under-theorized from its inception, a point to be
13. Possible answers to this question include the trial judge, the fact-finder, the appellate
court, or the legislature.
14. Jason R. Bent, P-Values, Priors, and Procedure in Antidiscrimination Law, 63 BUFF. L.
REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2014).
15. Selmi, supra note 4, at 478 (referring to systemic disparate treatment claims as "pattern or
practice claims").
16. See Green, supra note 2, at 418, 421; Selmi, supra note 4, at 500. Prior to Wal-Mart, the
Court and scholars had focused their attention primarily on the disparate impact theory of systemic
discrimination, rather than systemic disparate treatment. See Jason R. Bent, The Telltale Sign of
Discrimination: Probabilities, Information Asymmetries, and the Systemic Disparate Treatment
Theory, 44 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 797, 798-99, 799 n.5 (2011); Selmi, supra note 4, at 478.
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demonstrated herein. The theoretical and statistical foundation for sys-
temic disparate treatment law was never properly laid by the Court, lead-
ing to the current doctrinal and scholarly confusion.
As originally enacted, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro-
hibited discrimination "because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin," but the text of the statute said nothing about proving unlawful
discrimination with statistical evidence of disparities in employment out-
comes.17 In 1977, the Supreme Court recognized the "pattern or prac-
tice," or systemic disparate treatment, theory as one type of proof
framework that plaintiffs could employ to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.1 8 The theory originated as the Supreme Court's gloss on
the statutory prohibitions found in the text of Title VII. i 9 The birth of the
systemic disparate treatment theory through judicial construction is simi-
lar to the judicial creation of the first individual disparate treatment proof
framework in McDonnell Douglas Corporation. v. Green and the dis-
parate impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power Company.2' All of these
proof frameworks developed originally as judicial scaffolding built on
top of the vague and general statutory prohibitions found in Title VII.
The two formative cases for the systemic disparate treatment theory
22are International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States and Ha-
zelwood School District v. United States,23 both decided in 1977. After
1977, the Supreme Court would not directly address the systemic dispar-
ate treatment theory again until Wal-Mart, decided in 201 1.24 The basic
17. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241, 254 (1964)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., primarily 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
In amendments enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified a proof structure
for establishing unlawful discrimination under the disparate impact theory. See Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)). Congress, however, has not explicitly codified a proof structure for the systemic disparate
treatment theory. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
18. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, 358 (1977) (describing
the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), as
only one method of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title VII).
19. In laying out a proof structure for systemic disparate treatment, or "pattern or practice"
cases, the Teamsters Court drew upon language found in Section 707 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c). Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 328 n.1. This subsection originally
granted the Attorney General the authority to investigate and act upon a charge of a "pattern or
practice of discrimination." Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c), (e) (1964). That
authority was subsequently transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
in 1972. See id § 2000e-6(e).
20. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
22. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
23. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
24. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 478 ("In no other area of substantive antidiscrimination case
law-indeed, perhaps no other area of law-are the leading cases three decades old."). Even in Wal-
Mart the substance of the systemic disparate treatment theory was at issue only through the prism of
a procedural class certification question. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561-
62 (2011). As discussed below, the Court did touch upon the systemic disparate treatment theory in
its 1986 decision in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986), which approved the use of multiple
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idea underpinning the systemic disparate treatment theory is that unex-
plained statistical evidence of a quantitatively skewed distribution of
hiring, firing, promotion, or other employment outcomes can be evidence
that the employer unlawfully and intentionally discriminated against a
protected group.25 As the Teamsters Court famously put it:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case
such as this one only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign
of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be
expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in
a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic com-
position of the population in the community from which employees
are hired.
26
In Teamsters, the Court considered the government's claim that an
employer "had engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminating against
minorities in hiring so-called line drivers. 2 7 The government alleged that
minorities who had been hired by the employer "were given lower pay-
ing, less desirable jobs as servicemen or local city drivers, and were
thereafter discriminated against with respect to promotions and trans-
fers. 28
The Teamsters Court promulgated a two-phase framework for eval-
uating this type of systemic claim of employment discrimination. In
Phase I, plaintiffs may establish a prima facie case of systemic discrimi-
nation by showing "that unlawful discrimination has been a regular pro-
cedure or policy followed by an employer or group of employers.,,29 The
Court unequivocally approved the use of statistical evidence in making
this Phase I determination.30 If plaintiffs meet this initial burden, "[t]he
burden then shifts to the employer to defeat the prima facie showing of a
pattern or practice by demonstrating that the [plaintiff's] proof is either
inaccurate or insignificant."3' If the employer fails to defeat the plain-
regression analysis. See infra note 55 and accompanying text; see also Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 399-
401.
25. See Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic
Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 997 (1994).
26. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 n.20. This Article focuses on the importance of the words
"absent explanation" in that statement and approaches those words from a Bayesian statistical per-
spective. See also Paul Meier et al., What Happened in Hazelwood: Statistics, Employment Discrim-
ination, and the 80% Rule, in STATISTICS AND THE LAW 1, 20-21 (Morris H. DeGroot et al. eds.,
1986) (arguing that the assumption described in Teamsters is untenable and can only be taken as an
aspirational statement of a court's impartiality); Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical Proof of Discrimi-
nation: Beyond "Damned Lies", 68 WASH. L. REV. 477, 482-83, 503-05 (1993) (critiquing this
"[c]entral [a]ssumption").
27. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 360.
30. Id. at 339 ('" [S]tatistical analyses have served and will continue to serve an important
role' in cases in which the existence of discrimination is a disputed issue." (quoting Mayor of Phila.
v. Educ. Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974))).
31. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360.
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tiffs' prima facie showing of a pattern or practice of discrimination in
Phase I, then plaintiffs are entitled to an award of prospective relief, such
as an injunctive order.32 In Phase II, plaintiffs may seek individual relief
for each person in the alleged group of aggrieved individuals.33 The de-
termination that the employer engaged in a pattern or practice of discrim-
ination in Phase I leads to a rebuttable presumption that the employer's
pattern or practice of discrimination affected each individual claimant for
purposes of Phase II.
34
In Teamsters, the Court held that the government had carried its ini-
tial burden in Phase I by offering evidence of a statistical disparity in the
hiring of line drivers, along with the testimony of affected individuals to
bring the "cold numbers convincingly to life., 35 The Teamsters case in-
volved an extreme case of statistical disparity. The government showed
that of 1,828 line drivers only eight were African-American, and all of
those eight were hired after the litigation commenced.36 Responding to
the employer's challenge to the specific statistical comparisons used by
the government, the Court noted that no amount of fine tuning of the
statistical comparisons would change the "inexorable zero"-there had
been no African-American line drivers prior to the lawsuit.
37
In Hazelwood, systemic disparate treatment theory's second forma-
tive case, the Court reiterated its approval of the use of statistical evi-
dence to shift the burden of disproving discrimination onto the defend-
ant.38 While the statistical showing in Teamsters consisted of a very sim-
ple descriptive analysis highlighting the inexorable zero among a rela-
tively large number of line drivers, the statistical analysis at issue in Ha-
zelwood was more sophisticated.39 There, the government alleged that the
Hazelwood School District had engaged in a "pattern or practice" of dis-
crimination in hiring teachers.40 The government offered statistical evi-
dence in the form of a binomial distribution analysis, a concept explored
in depth in Part II of this Article.4' The government argued that a statisti-
cal comparison of the percentage of African-American teachers em-
ployed by the school district to the percentage of African-American
teachers in the relevant comparison labor market could serve as proof of
32. Id. at 361.
33. Id.
34. Allan G. King, "Gross Statistical Disparities" as Evidence of a Pattern and Practice of
Discrimination: Statistical Versus Legal Significance, 22 LAB. LAW. 271, 282 (2007) ("[T]he pre-
sumption created primarily by this statistical proof applies to each and every class member and
requires the employer to rebut that presumption in each specific instance.").
35. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339-40, 342-43.
36. Id. at 337.
37. Id. at 342 n.23 (citation omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted).
38. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977).
39. See, e.g., Zimmer, supra note 3, at 422.
40. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id at 303, 308; see infra Part II.A.I.
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a discriminatory pattern or practice in the district's hiring of teachers.42
The Court drew upon the reasoning in Teamsters and stated that "[w]here
gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case
constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination.43
The Hazelwood Court endorsed the use of binomial distribution analysis
to show the required "gross statistical disparities."44 If the difference
between the expected number of African-American teachers (calculated
by reference to the relevant labor pool, or "reference class") and the ob-
served number of African-American teachers actually hired by the dis-
trict "is greater than two or three standard deviations," the Court stated,
the "hypothesis that eachers were hired without regard to race would be
suspect.
4 5
Teamsters and Hazelwood remained the leading cases on the sys-
temic disparate treatment theory until Wal-Mart.46 As statistician Paul
Meier explained, after Teamsters and Hazelwood, "a flood of statistical
tests of significance, confidence intervals, and multiple regressions thun-
dered forth from the lower courts. 47 More recently, systemic theories of
discrimination have become a centerpiece of the EEOC's enforcement
strategy. The EEOC's newly-released Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years
2012-2016 emphasizes the importance of systemic cases, and it includes
performance measures unequivocally requiring that an increasing per-
centage of the EEOC's cases be systemic cases .48 How the Wal-Mart
decision will impact private and EEOC systemic disparate treatment liti-
42. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 303, 308-09.
43. Id. at 307-08 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339); see also Selmi, supra note 4, at 480
(noting that the early systemic disparate treatment cases were "almost entirely statistical in nature").
After Hazelwood, lower courts have frequently acknowledged that a prima facie case of systemic
disparate treatment discrimination may be established by statistical evidence alone. See, e.g., EEOC
v. Olson's Dairy Queens, Inc., 989 F.2d 165, 168 (5th Cir. 1993) (relying on statistical comparisons
alone to reverse district court's decision that no prima facie case had been established under the
Teamsters framework); Satchell v. FedEx Express, No. C 03-2659 SI, 2006 WL 3507913, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2006) (plaintiffs can prove their prima facie case "with or without anecdotal
testimony"); McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Servs., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d I, 17 (D.D.C. 2004)
("[P]laintiffs may sustain their burden at the prima facie stage exclusively on statistical evidence, for
'no sound policy reason exists for subjecting the plaintiff to the additional requirement of either
providing anecdotal evidence or showing gross disparities."' (quoting Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d
1249, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).
44. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08.
45. Id. at 308 n.14 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497 n.17 (1977)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
46. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 492-93.
47. See Meier et al., supra note 26, at 3.
48. Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2012-2016, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/strategicplan_l 2tol 6.cfm (last visited Aug. 1, 2014).
The Strategic Plan anticipates that the EEOC will adopt a performance measure based on the per-
centage of the cases in the litigation docket that are systemic cases and anticipates that the target for
this performance measure will increase every year from 2012 to 2016. See id (Performance Measure
4 for Strategy I.A.3 of Strategy Objective I). As envisioned by the Strategic Plan, the EEOC adopted
an accompanying Strategic Enforcement Plan that also emphasizes systemic discrimination litiga-
tion. Id. (app. B - Strategic Enforcement Plan & Quality Control Plan Timelines).
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gation remains to be seen and is the subject of Part II.C below.49 But it is
clear that systemic disparate treatment law is at a critical juncture. The
next Part illustrates the current divide in the legal scholarship about the
proper course of systemic disparate treatment law and considers how
Wal-Mart may represent a turning point.
II. SYSTEMIC DISPARATE TREATMENT AT A CROSSROADS
A. Methodological Strand. The Limits of Statistical Evidence
Statistical evidence forms the cornerstone of most systemic dispar-
ate treatment cases.50 But the mechanism through which statistical evi-
dence is thought to justify an inference of unlawful discrimination has
been frequently misunderstood, or at least glossed over, by courts and
scholars.51 The first major strand of systemic disparate treatment scholar-
ship to develop in the wake of Teamsters and Hazelwood carefully de-
tailed the inferential limitations of the statistics offered in systemic dis-
crimination cases. Authors writing in this methodological strand took
courts to task for misinterpreting and misapplying statistical evidence to
arrive at unwarranted conclusions that discrimination, rather than chance
or luck, was the most likely explanation for a statistically significant dis-
parity in employment outcomes.
52
Understanding the nature of the methodological critiques requires a
closer look at the types of statistical evidence commonly offered in sys-
temic discrimination cases. Two types of statistical evidence have been
explicitly approved by the Court for use in employment discrimination
cases: binomial distributions, approved in Hazelwood,53 and multiple
regressions, approved by the Supreme Court in Bazemore v. Friday,54
decided in 1986.55 In both binomial distribution and multiple regression,
statistical experts look for statistically significant results. Courts often
49. Notably, Wal-Mart's holding on the commonality issue is inapplicable to systemic claims
brought by the EEOC. The EEOC's systemic discrimination cases need not comply with the class
certification requirements of Federal Rule 23. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S.
318, 323 (1980).
50. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
135 (7th ed. 2008); Meier et al., supra note 26, at 3; Selmi, supra note 4, at 485.
51. See Bent, supra note 16, at 833 n.145 (explaining how courts misinterpret statistical
evidence of discrimination); Browne, supra note 26, at 486-88 (illustrating where "courts have gone
wrong" in the use of statistical evidence of discrimination); Kinsley R. Browne, The Strangely
Persistent "Transposition Fallacy": Why "Statistically Significant" Evidence of Discrimination
May Not Be Significant, 14 LAB. LAW. 437, 437, 441-42 (1998); Richard Lempert, The Significance
of Statistical Significance: Two Authors Restate an Incontrovertible Caution. Why a Book?, 34 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 225, 237-41 (2009).
52. See infra Part II.A.3-4.
53. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977).
54. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
55. Id. at 387 (involving a claim of salary discrimination); see also Roberto Corrada, Ricci's
Dicta: Signaling a New Standard for Affirmative Action Under Title VII?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
241, 249 n.59 (2011) (identifying binomial distribution and multiple regression as the two types of
statistical analysis approved by the Supreme Court).
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consider statistical significance sufficient to establish a prima facie case
of systemic discrimination under Phase I of Teamsters, thus establishing
liability and shifting onto the defendant the burden of disproving dis-
crimination as to the individual claimants or class members.
56
Many, though not all, antidiscrimination scholars consider these two
statistical methodologies adequate to support an inference of unlawful
57discrimination. But it is important to understand exactly how such an
inference has been justified. The inference of discrimination arises not
because binomial distribution or regression analysis directly proves the
likelihood that the employer in question discriminated. Instead, the infer-
ence is indirect.58 The statistical techniques of binomial distribution and
multiple regression allow a statistician to conclude that chance alone
would be relatively unlikely to lead to the observed disparities given the
important assumption that employment decisions were made at random. 59
This assumption that employment decisions were made at random .is
called the null hypothesis.60 If, assuming the null hypothesis to be true,
pure chance would lead to the observed disparity in less than some pre-
determined statistically significant level of repetitions (often set at 5% or
.05), then a (frequentist)61 statistician will believe the evidence supports
rejection of the null hypothesis.62
If an observed disparity is statistically significant and the null hy-
pothesis of random decision-making can be rejected, proponents of sta-
tistical evidence argue, reason and logic should allow the court or fact
56. See King, supra note 34, at 272 (noting that in pattern or practice cases applying the
Teamsters framework "lower courts frequently have turned to 'statistical significance' as the meas-
uring rod"); Meier et al., supra note 26, at 20-21; Ramona L. Paetzold, Problems with Statistical
Significance in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 395, 395-96 (1991)
("Although [hypothesis testing] has only been used for a few decades in legal proceedings, it has
become the predominant method of statistical analysis used in employment discrimination cases.");
Selmi, supra note 4, at 481-82; see also Green, supra note 2, at 403 (reading Teamsters and Hazel-
wood as "instruct[ing] that if the disparity after accounting for legitimate factors is statistically
significant-meaning that it is unlikely due to chance-then an inference of internal systemic dis-
parate treatment can be drawn and entity liability imposed").
57. See, e.g., RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF
DISCRIMINATION: USING STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN DISCRIMINATION CASES § 4.13 (2005); ZIMMER
ET AL., supra note 50, at 144-45 ("When any one of these techniques is used to conclude that the
null hypothesis . .. should be rejected, the next step, based on reason and logic, should be to draw
the inference that systemic disparate treatment discrimination has occurred."). But see Browne,
supra note 26, at 488, 489 n.41 (arguing that neither binomial distribution analysis nor regression
analysis should give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination because the court cannot know
the prior unconditional probability of discrimination).
58. See Steven L. Willbom & Ramona L. Paetzold, Statistics Is a Plural Word, 122 HARV. L.
REV. F. 48, 48 (2009) ("Statistics is imperfect as proof of causation in the same way that every other
type of proof is imperfect-it is messy, indirect, uncertain, and subject to varying interpretations.").
59. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 4.13, at 38-41, § 12.03, at 7-8; ZIMMER ET
AL., supra note 50, at 142; Corrada, supra note 55, at 249 n.59.
60. PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 4.11, at 36; ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 50, at
142.
61. See infra Part III.B for a brief discussion of the ongoing philosophical debate between
frequentists and Bayesians in the statistics literature.
62. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 4.12, at 37.
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finder to take the next step and indirectly infer that the employment deci-
sions at issue were likely the result of discrimination and were not likely
caused by chance or some other non-discriminatory factor.63 Not all
scholars are comfortable making this indirect inference from evidence of
a statistically significant disparity in employment outcomes. Some au-
thors writing in the methodological strand have repeatedly highlighted
the limitations of the binomial distribution and multiple regression meth-
odologies currently accepted by courts, and some argue that these statis-
tical techniques are simply inadequate to perform the role prescribed for
them by the Teamsters and Hazelwood opinions.64 The statistical tech-
niques at issue, and the methodological critiques, are discussed in further
detail below.
1. Binomial Distribution
In a binomial distribution analysis, the statistician typically com-
pares the observed percentage of members of a protected group, say Af-
rican-Americans, that were actually hired by the employer (or promoted,
terminated, or subjected to other employment action) to the expected
percentage of members of that group that would have been hired if the
employment decisions were made at random.65 Thus, in Hazelwood, the
government offered evidence comparing the percentage of African-
American teachers hired by the Hazelwood School District to the per-
centage of African-American teachers in St. Louis County and the City
of St. Louis, which the government considered to be the proper compari-
son labor market.66 Defendants disputed the relevance of that comparison
market by arguing that the City of St. Louis had made special attempts to
seek a 50% African-American teaching staff, thus distorting that compar-
ison pool.67 The Supreme Court ultimately approved the use of binomial
distribution analysis for comparing the racial composition of Hazel-
wood's teaching staff to "the racial composition of the qualified public
school teacher population in the relevant labor market."68 The Court,
however, left it to the district court on remand to decide the proper com-
parison labor market.
69
In performing a binomial distribution analysis, a statistician might
find that the disparity between the observed and expected percentage of
63. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 50, at 144-45.
64. See infra Part II.A.3-4.
65. See Meier et al., supra note 26, at 6-7; ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 50, at 145-51. There
are several variants on this simple binomial distribution analysis, including one-sample models, two-
sample binomial model, and one- and two-sided significance tests. See Meier et al., supra note 26, at
6-15. The methodological details of the variants are beyond the scope of this Article, and the differ-
ences between the variants are not important for purposes of the analysis that follows in this Article.
66. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 310 (1977).
67. Id. at 310-11.
68. Id. at 308.
69. Id. at 312-13 ("It is thus clear that a determination of the appropriate comparative figures
in this case will depend upon further evaluation by the trial court.").
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African-American hires is statistically significant. A finding of statistical
significance at the .05 level in a binomial distribution analysis means that
random chance would lead to the observed disparity (or an even more
skewed disparity) only 1 time in 20 repetitions of the hiring process, as-
suming that employment decisions in each repetition of the hiring pro-
cess were made at random.70 Based on this result, the statistician has
some basis for rejecting the null hypothesis that employment decisions
were made at random. Importantly, however, a finding of statistical sig-
nificance at the .05 level does not mean that there is a 95% likelihood
that the employer unlawfully discriminated, nor does it mean that there is
a 5% likelihood that the disparity was caused by chance.7'
2. Multiple Regression
Multiple regression analysis involves a more sophisticated tech-
nique that can model the relationship of multiple independent, or explan-
atory, variables-such as education level, experience, and gender-with
the employment outcome or other dependent variable in question-such
as salary-given certain modeling assumptions. In a regression analysis
the statistician constructs a model that includes a number of selected
independent variables that are thought to have some predictive relation-
ship with the dependent variable in question and then attempts to isolate
the predictive effects of each particular independent variable by condi-
tioning on the other included independent variables.7 2 The multiple re-
gression model attempts to determine the characteristics of a mathemati-
cal function that best fits or explains all the observed data points for all
the included variables in the model.73
One reason that multiple regression models are appealing is that
they are able to provide results in the form of a coefficient for each inde-
70. See Paetzold, supra note 56, at 400 ("In other words, if the p-value is 0.05 or smaller, the
discrepancy between actual hiring practices and assumed hiring practices is considered to be statisti-
cally significant. If the p-value is greater than 0.05, then the discrepancy is not statistically signifi-
cant."). Setting the cutoff for statistical significance "is somewhat arbitrary." Id. There is no mathe-
matical rule requiring that it be set at .05, but that level is commonly used in the social sciences to
identify significant results. Id. For a discussion of the historical origins of the .05 level of statistical
significance, the work of R.A. Fisher, and Fisher's acknowledgment that the choice of .05 was
subjective, see Michael 1. Meyerson & William Meyerson, Significant Statistics: The Unwitting
Policy Making of Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 771, 823-24 (2010).
71. E.g., Browne, supra note 51, at 449. These common misstatements of statistically signifi-
cant results are examples of the transposition fallacy. See infra Part II.A.3.
72. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 50, at 151-55; Delores A. Conway & Harry V. Roberts,
Regression Analyses in Employment Discrimination Cases, in STATISTICS AND THE LAW, supra note
26, at 107, 126 ("Multiple regression, as opposed to simple regression, permits simultaneous investi-
gation of the relationship between salaries and multiple job qualifications."). See generally D. James
Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533, 535-36 (2008) ("[A]
perusal of the hombooks and looseleafs discussing the use of statistics as evidence in civil rights
litigation suggests that the field is fixated on methods introduced decades ago, particularly regres-
sion, despite judicial dissatisfaction." (footnote omitted)); Willbom & Paetzold, supra note 58, at 49
(referring to regression as the "predominant statistical technique used in civil rights litigation").
73. See Greiner, supra note 72, at 541-42.
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pendent variable that tell the statistician the direction and estimated mag-
nitude of the effect of a unit change in each particular independent varia-
ble on the dependent variable of interest-salary, in this example7 4 A
regression result may indicate that a change in the gender variable from
male to female has a negative effect on annual salary (direction) and that
a change in the gender variable from male to female results in a decrease
in annual salary of $1,000 (magnitude). A statistician would have some
degree of confidence in these coefficient estimates only if certain diag-
nostic tests for model fit 75 are satisfied and only if the results found for
the independent variable of interest-in this example, gender-are statis-
tically significant.76 As with a binomial distribution model, determining
whether the coefficient is statistically significant means that the statisti-
cian tests the regression results against a null hypothesis. Here, the null
hypothesis is that the independent variable we are interested in (gender)
has no correlative relationship with the dependent variable (salary). In
other words, the null hypothesis is that the coefficient for the gender var-
iable equals 0. A multiple regression result for a given independent vari-
able will be statistically significant at the .05 level-or have a p-value of
less than .05-if, assuming the null hypothesis to be true, pure chance or
randomness would have led to the observed correlative results-or even
stronger evidence of a correlative relationship-in 5% or less of many
repetitions of the analysis.77
3. The Transposition Fallacy Challenge
A key critique levied by authors in the methodological strand, and
persuasively articulated by Professor Kingsley Browne, is that courts
regularly misinterpret statistically significant results obtained from bi-
nomial distribution or regression analysis by committing what is often
referred to as the "transposition fallacy.' 78 Courts commit the transposi-
tion fallacy, sometimes with the inadvertent help of testifying statistical
experts, by forgetting that binomial distribution and regression analyses
74. Id. at 541.
75. See generally id. at 542 ("When a [regression] diagnostic shows a lack of fit ... a consci-
entious analyst alters the model.").
76. See Willbom & Paetzold, supra note 58, at 59.
77. For additional information on interpreting the results of multiple regression analyses, see
Interpreting Regression Output, PRINCETON UNIV.,
http://dss.princeton.edu/online help/analysis/interpretingregression.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
78. See DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT
EVIDENCE § 12.8.3.a nn. 22-23 (2d ed. 2010) (collecting cases where the error is committed);
Browne, supra note 51, at 447 ("The error committed by courts engaging in the transposition fallacy
is remarkable, however, for its ubiquity; the vast majority of courts that describe the meaning ofap-
value explain it in terms embodying the fallacy."); David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and the
Burden of Persuasion, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 21-23 (1983).
For an interesting discussion of the transposition fallacy in the context of DNA evidence
in a criminal case, see David H. Kaye, Commentary, "False but Highly Persuasive": How Wrong
Were the Probability Estimates in McDaniel v. Brown?, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1
(2009).
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are limited to testing a null hypothesis.79 Professor Browne documents
"cases from virtually all the circuits" that misstate the import of statisti-
cal evidence by committing the transposition fallacy.80 Thus, in the case
of a binomial distribution analysis, a typical misstatement by a court
about statistical significance is: "[T]he .05 level of significance... [is]
certainly sufficient to support an inference of discrimination. [T]he .05
level. .. indicates that the odds are one in 20 that the result could have
occurred by chance."
81
This statement is incorrect. As Professor Browne points out, it con-
fuses two different conditional probabilities: First is the conditional
probability that the employer selected employees randomly given the
observed disparity-what the court incorrectly claims is shown by the
statistics.8 2 Second is the conditional probability that we would see the
observed disparity given the assumption that the employer selected em-
ployees randomly-what the statistical results actually show.8 3 A finding
of statistical significance at the .05 level means that an employer known
or assumed to hire employees at random would nonetheless arrive at
results as skewed with respect to the protected characteristic as the actual
observed disparity in no more than 1 in 20 repetitions of the hiring pro-
cedure. Importantly, statistical significance at the .05 level does not mean
that it is 95% likely that this employer's actual hiring in this particular
case was non-random, discriminatory, or otherwise suspect. Statistical
significance at the .05 level does not mean-contrary to the D.C. Cir-
cuit's assertion-that "the odds are one in 20 that the result could have
occurred by chance."
84
As Professor Browne emphasizes, the probability that the defendant
selected employees discriminatorily is actually a function of another
79. Browne, supra note 51, at 447, 447 n.25 (documenting expert testimony that appears to
include the transposition fallacy).
80. Id. at 447; see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 78, § 12.8.3.a. nn.22-23 (collecting state and
federal opinions committing the transposition fallacy); Browne, supra note 26, at 491-92 (collecting
examples from appellate courts, district courts, statistical expert witnesses, and commentators).
81. Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted) (quoting Segar v.
Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1282 83 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoted in
Browne, supra note 25, at 491 n.46.
82. See Browne, supra note 26, at 507.
83. See id.
84. Palmer, 815 F.2d at 92 (quoting Segar, 738 F.2d at 1282) (internal quotation mark omit-
ted). Notably, the district court in Wal-Mart committed the transposition fallacy when describing
statistical significance. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 156 n.23 (N.D. Cal.
2004), aff'd 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), opinion withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh 'g,
509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011) ("Statistical significance is measured by standard deviations. The standard deviation is a
number that quantifies the probability that chance is responsible for any difference between an
expected outcome and the observed outcome in a sample containing two groups."). For examples of
courts committing the transposition fallacy in the context of DNA match evidence in criminal cases,
see KAYE ET AL., supra note 78, § 12.8.5 n.96, § 14.1.2.a, and Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers?
Deciding when DNA Alone Is Enough to Convict, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130, 1150-56 (2010) (urging
courts to apply Bayes' Theorem in DNA match cases).
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number: "the likelihood of discrimination prior to making the employ-
ment decision."85 In other words, the base rate or background rate of
discrimination matters when interpreting statistical evidence. If it were
known as fact that only 1% of all employers are discriminators, for ex-
ample, then a binomial distribution analysis finding a disparity statistical-
ly significant at a p-value = .05 would mean that for every 100 employers
tested we would expect to find 6 "positive" test results-5 false positives
due to chance plus 1 true positive due to the employer being guilty of
86discrimination . If we assume the base rate of discrimination is only 1%,
a positive binomial distribution test (one finding a statistically significant
disparity with p-value = .05) does not make it more likely than not that
the defendant before the court is guilty of discrimination. Rather, in the
absence of any evidence other than the base rate assumption and the
positive statistical test the probability would be 1 in 6-or about 0.17-
that the employer is a discriminator.87 Given the base rate assumption of
1%, the statistical evidence from the binomial distribution should there-
fore be insufficient by itself to establish liability, contrary to Teamsters
and Hazelwood.88
A leading employment discrimination text counters Professor
Browne's critique by noting that there is no reason necessarily to assume
"that base rate discrimination is especially rare."89 If the base rate of dis-
85. Browne, supra note 26, at 488 ("In the discrimination context, the probability that an
employer's work-force disparities are a consequence of chance is completely dependent upon a
statistic which the courts never have: the likelihood of discrimination prior to making the employ-
ment decision.").
86. It should be noted here that this is a simplified example designed to illustrate the im-
portance of the base rate, or background rate, of discrimination. This simplified example ignores the
possibility of false negatives-cases in which the employer actually discriminates but the statistical
test results are not statistically significant. The relationship between false negatives (or Type 11 error)
and false positives (or Type I error) is complex. "By adopting a standard that minimizes the number
of Type I errors, the chance of identifying discrimination when it actually occurs is reduced."
PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 2.04. One statistician's model estimates that if the level of
statistical significance is set at .05, meaning that there is a 5% risk of Type I error, the corresponding
risk of Type II error will be approximately 50%. John M. Dawson, Scientific Investigation of Fact-
The Role of the Statistician, II FORUM 896,906-08 (1976). Despite the simplifying assumption used
in these examples, the central point remains that prior probabilities will necessarily influence the
interpretation of the statistical data, and in some cases different prior probabilities will lead to drasti-
cally different conclusions about the likelihood of discrimination in any given case, even though the
statistical evidence remains exactly the same. This simplified example is used in ZIMMER ET AL.,
supra note 50, at 144.
87. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 50, at 144.
88. It is not clear precisely where the threshold should be drawn for shifting the burden of
proof onto the defendant under the Teamsters framework. Absolute certainty is, of course, not re-
quired. But what estimate of the probability of discrimination should be considered sufficient to shift
the burden onto defendant? In earlier work, I articulated one possible test for determining when to
shift the burden of proof under Teamsters that considered three factors: the unconditional prior
probability of discrimination, or estimates of background rates of discrimination; the strength of the
statistical evidence of disparity; and the parties' relative access to information. Bent, supra note 16,
at 802.
89. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 50, at 144 (acknowledging that Professor Browne is "theo-
retically correct" but pointing out that he "fails to demonstrate why the legal system should conclude
that base rate discrimination is especially rare"). Professor Zimmer et al., also point out the limited
legal effect of a statistical showing establishing the plaintiffs' prima facie case. The defendant has
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crimination was assumed to be 10% instead of 1%, then for every 100
employers tested we would find 15 "positive" results-5 false positives
due to chance plus 10 true positives due to the employer being guilty of
discrimination.90 In the absence of any other evidence, the probability
would then be 10 in 15-or about 0.67-that the defendant-employer is
guilty of discrimination.9 Given this higher base rate assumption of
10%, it might make sense to shift the burden of proof onto the defendant
upon a showing of statistical evidence with a p-value = .05. But rather
than refuting Browne's argument, this point only underscores the im-
portance of the base rate, i.e., the prior probability, of discrimination. A
change in base rate from 1% to 10% made all the difference!
The base rate problem is a flaw that undermines our current under-
standing of the Teamsters approach to systemic disparate treatment law.
Reasonable people can disagree about the true base rate of employment
discrimination and therefore can disagree about the prior probability of
discrimination in any given case. Hence, reasonable people can disagree
about whether an inference of discrimination or the imposition of liabil-
ity for systemic disparate treatment should attach upon a showing of a
statistically significant disparity with a p-value = .05. 9
Professor Browne's attack leads him to conclude that current statis-
tical methods for proving systemic disparate treatment should probably
be "abandoned altogether.,93 Browne also suggested, however, that tradi-
tional statistical proof might be acceptable if a more rigorous standard of
statistical significance than .05 were applied and if courts required
"strong[] anecdotal evidence" to buttress the statistical showing.94
"the opportunity to rebut by offering proof that it does not discriminate. Sufficiently strong testimo-
ny might convince the jury that it was chance that explained the disparity." Id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. ("The problem is a 'base rate' one . .
93. Browne, supra note 26, at 553 ("Hypothesis testing, with its reliance on the assumption
that the resultant p-value represents the probability that the observed distribution was a consequence
of chance and its declaration of results as 'statistically significant,' should be abandoned altogether.
Such evidence is simply irrelevant to the ultimate question." (footnote omitted)).
94. Id. at 541-42, 554. Browne appears to acknowledge the possibility of a continuing role for
statistical evidence but only where "substantially more rigorous criteria" are applied. Id. at 554. He
contends that if statistical analyses are to be used, courts should require that they show "gross statis-
tical disparities," rather than just ordinary statistical significance (often set at the .05 level), that they
be accompanied by "strong anecdotal evidence" of discrimination, and that courts adhere to proper
allocations of burdens of proof. See id. at 541-42, 549, 554. Professor Browne concludes:
If statistical proof of discrimination is still to be acceptable at all in court-which per-
haps is doubtful-courts must pay more than lip service to the principle that throughout
the litigation it is the plaintiffs burden to demonstrate that impermissible discrimination
is "the company's standard operating procedure-the regular rather than the unusual
practice."
Id. at 555 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977)).
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4. The Potential Outcomes Challenge
Professor Browne is not alone in criticizing traditional statistical ev-
idence offered to show systemic disparate treatment.95 Professor D.
James Greiner recently levied an attack on the use of multiple regression
analysis in discrimination cases.96 He argues that multiple regression
analysis often "give[s] the wrong answer, or contradictory answers" to
the questions that are actually important in systemic discrimination liti-
gation. The key problem, as Professor Greiner sees it, is that regres-
sions "lack ... a framework for causal inference."98 According to
Greiner, the legal community seems to believe, erroneously, "that one
can measure the causal effect of any variable by including it on the right-
hand side of the equals sign in a regression equation."
99
Professor Greiner focuses on several specific shortcomings of mul-
tiple regression models, ranging from the judgment calls required in se-
lecting which independent variables to include in the model to the poten-
tial for analyst bias in specifying the regression model and testing for
fit. 00 Fundamentally, he argues that regression models cannot support a
causal inference and therefore cannot tell judges and juries what they
actually would like to know-how likely is it that the observed dispari-
ties in employment outcomes were caused by the defendant's unlawful
discrimination?10'
Professor Greiner recommends an alternative quantitative tool for
attempting to measure causal inference in discrimination cases-
potential outcomes analysis.'02 In contrast to multiple regression, the
potential outcomes technique attempts to approximate, to the extent pos-
sible, a randomized experiment using only observational data drawn
from observed employment outcomes.'0 3 The potential outcomes model
matches up pairs-or sometimes small groups-of observational data
points that are closely correlated in all potentially relevant explanatory
covariates (e.g., position, performance evaluations, years of experience,
95. See also Ben Ikuta, Note, Why Binomial Distributions Do Not Work as Proof of Employ-
ment Discrimination, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1235, 1235 (2008).
96. See Greiner, supra note 72, at 534.
97. Id. at 538.
98. Id. at 543.
99. Id. at 544.
100. See id at 544-56.
101. Id. at 556 57.
102. Id. at 557. Potential outcomes analysis is also sometimes referred to in the literature as
"matching," the "counterfactual" model, or the Rubin Causal Model. See, e.g., ROBERT B. SMITH,
MULTILEVEL MODELING OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS: A CAUSAL PERSPECTIVE 13 (2011). The modem
revival of the potential outcomes method of causal inference is often attributed to Donald Rubin. See
Guido W. Imbens & Donald B. Rubin, Causal Inference in Statistics and Social Sciences § 1.1-1.12
(Jan. 30, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), for a detailed explanation of the
potential outcomes model.
103. See Greiner, supra note 72, at 537-38, 557-58.
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education, training) but that diametrically differ on the explanatory vari-
able of interest (e.g., gender).1
0 4
In a potential outcomes model, this matching is typically performed
by creating a sort of index statistic that measures the combination of each




Once the data is sorted into matched pairs using propensity scores, it can
then be considered a rough approximation of a randomized, controlled
experiment in which one group is the control group (male) while the oth-
er is the treatment group (female).0 6 The benefit of matching is that it
allows the researcher to "borrow" the unobserved, counterfactual poten-
tial outcome for any given individual from the other individual in the
matched pair.'0 7 In other words, a potential outcomes model provides
some basis for inferring what he counterfactual state of the world would
look like-a female's salary, if that female had been male, but in all oth-
er respects identical.0 8 After matching, employment outcomes are com-
pared across the matched pairs to estimate the average treatment effect
i.e., the average effect on salary of any given individual being female,
rather than male.0 9 The researcher can further narrow the results by
looking at the average treatment effect on salary for only those in the
treatment group-females-or for only those in certain portions of the
salary distribution. 10
By isolating matched pairs, the potential outcomes technique has
the benefit of controlling for covariates using research model design,
rather than relying on a multiple regression analysis with built-in as-
sumptions about linearity and constant effects across the salary distribu-
tion.'" Further, a statistician conducting a multiple regression analysis
will usually need to peek at the regression coefficients and p-values be-
fore evaluating whether the regression model was a satisfactory fit to the
data set.112 Professor Greiner emphasizes the importance of this differ-
ence, noting that an expert using a potential outcomes analysis is more
credible because the model can be fully specified before peeking at the
results. '' 3
The potential outcomes approach may represent an improvement
over regression in many cases, and it has unquestionably increased in
104. See id. at 570-73.
105. See id. at574-75.
106. See id at 575-76.
107. See id at 562 (referring to donated values for counterfactual states).
108. See id.
109. See id. at 558-60.
110. See id. at 567-68.
111. See id. at 548,580-81.
112. See id. at 544.
113. See id.
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popularity in the social sciences. 114 Nonetheless, it still falls short of the
"gold standard" of a completely randomized experiment, as does any
technique that relies on observational data.15 Whenever a research de-
sign includes an "assignment mechanism"-that is, the force that deter-
mines whether an individual ends up in the treatment group or the control
group-that is outside the researcher's control and that is non-random, the
results will necessarily be open to challenge as a basis for causal infer-
ence. 16 Of course, in the context of employment discrimination litigation
the assignment mechanism is always non-random and is always out of
the researcher's control. A researcher obviously cannot randomly assign
individual employees to a gender treatment group-male or female-and
then observe the results. Without a controlled, randomized experiment,
the potential exists that unobserved covariates are confounding the anal-
ysis making the results misleading. Unobserved covariates cannot be
controlled for in a regression model and cannot be included in a propen-
sity score calculation to match individuals in a potential outcomes model.
The potential outcomes model suffers from other drawbacks as
well, as highlighted by Professors Steven Willborn and Ramona
Paetzold.17 Importantly, a potential outcomes analyst must make "com-
plex decisions about which variables to include" in performing the task
of matching pairs." 8 These decisions are similar to the difficult choices
that regression analysts make when determining which covariates to in-
clude in their regression models. If the calculation of propensity scores
misses certain important unobserved variables, then it is open to bias in
much the same way as a regression.'1 9 Second, the potential outcomes
approach usually requires a process called "trimming," which throws out
some potentially relevant data-those data points for which there is no
match close enough on the covariates in the other group.20 The outliers
in the tails of the distribution of covariates are simply disregarded on the
justification that they do not provide much useful information for draw-
ing inferences anyway.1 21 Throwing out data may amount to ignoring
114. See STEPHEN L. MORGAN & CHRISTOPHER WINSHIP, COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSAL
INFERENCE: METHODS AND PRINCIPLES FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 87 (2007) ("[A]mong social scien-
tists who adopt a counterfactual perspective, matching methods are fast becoming an indispensable
technique for prosecuting causal questions, even though they usually prove to be the beginning
rather than the end of causal analysis on any particular topic.").
115. See Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 58, at 50; Imbens & Rubin, supra note 102, § 15.1.
116. See Imbens & Rubin, supra note 102, § 8. 1, § 15.1.
117. See Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 58, at 48-56.
118. See id. at 52 ("Inferences about outcomes are only as good as the covariates that have
been included. A similar point is also true for regression-variables that are not included in the
regression model are not controlled and their effects on the outcome cannot be ascertained."); see
also KAYE ET AL., supra note 78, § 12.5.3 n.43 (noting that a potential outcomes "mode of analysis
also demands an appreciation of potential confounders and adequate data if it is to 'balance covari-
ates ').
119. See MORGAN & WINSHIP, supra note 114, at 122 (noting that matching is vulnerable to a
"selection on the unobservables" bias).
120. See Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 58, at 55.
121. See id.; Greiner, supra note 72, at 566.
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potentially relevant evidence of discrimination. 22 Further, by trimming
the data to only those areas of the distribution of covariates where the
treatment group and the control group have sufficient overlap, a consci-
entious potential outcomes analyst will properly report the results as the
estimate of a defined local average treatment effect-that is, the average
treatment effect only for those individuals falling in the overlap region.
23
This means that the analyst cannot make causal claims about the effect of
gender on wages for those who fall outside the region of covariate over-
lap, which may very well include some plaintiffs.
Finally, and most fundamentally, as Professors Willborn and
Paetzold explain, the potential outcomes model ultimately requires the
same indirect causal inference to discrimination that regression models
require. 124 After matching, trimming, and generating an estimated local
average treatment effect, the final step in a potential outcomes analysis is
to calculate the standard error for the estimate so that the researcher can
determine whether the estimated effect is statistically significant.125 That
is, the analyst will attempt to determine how often random chance would
lead to the observation of an average treatment effect as large or larger
than the one observed and test the null hypothesis that the treatment-
gender = female-has zero effect. If the researcher rejects the null hy-
pothesis, then it may permit an indirect inference that unlawful discrimi-
nation caused the observed outcome disparities. This indirect mode of
inferring a causal effect means that potential outcomes results are vulner-
able to the same type of misinterpretation via the transposition fallacy as
the examples discussed in the preceding subpart.
So where does this discourse in the methodological strand leave us?
Professors Browne and Greiner both appear to believe that the currently-
used statistical methodologies of binomial distribution and regression
modeling are inadequate to justify an inference of discrimination. Profes-
sor Greiner advocates the use of potential outcomes models to avoid im-
plausible assumptions and potential analyst bias involved in regression
analysis.26 Professors Willborn and Paetzold freely admit the messy and
indirect nature of statistical inference using the traditional techniques, but
nonetheless contend that flawed statistical evidence-whether binomial
distributions, regressions, or potential outcomes-can still convey some
122. Willbom & Paetzold, supra note 58, at 55.
123. See MORGAN & WINSHIP, supra note 114, at 117 ("Resulting estimates are then interpret-
ed as estimates of a narrower treatment effect: the common-support treatment effect for the treat-
ed.").
124. See Willbom & Paetzold, supra note 58, at 60 (stating that nonstatistical circumstantial
evidence, regression, and potential outcomes all use the same causal framework by "answering the
question of how likely it is that we would see this outcome in the absence of discrimination").
125. See MORGAN & WINSHIP, supra note 114, at 118 ("After computing a matching estimate
of some form, most researchers naturally desire a measure of its expected variability across samples
of the same size from the same population, either to conduct hypothesis tests or to offer an informed
posterior distribution for the causal effect that can guide subsequent research.").
126. See supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
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relevant information and therefore has some value in litigation, just like
any piece of nonstatistical, circumstantial evidence of discriminatory
intent.127 Meanwhile, in the absence of a coherent methodological cri-
tique from the legal academy, courts continue to rely on binomial distri-
butions and multiple regressions and regularly misinterpret the meaning
of statistically significant results obtained therefrom.121
B. Contextualist Strand. Organizational Causes ofDiscrimination
The second strand of scholarship on systemic disparate treatment
theory has an entirely different focus. Led by Professor Tristin Green's
contribution to the Working Group, the contextualist strand represents an
attempt to expand the conception of systemic disparate treatment law to
impose liability on employers at the entity level.129 Under this view, sys-
temic disparate treatment was not meant to be a simple aggregation of
multiple instances of discrimination occurring at the individual level.
Rather, systemic disparate treatment law serves a broader purpose:
"[T]he employer's responsibility under this model turns not on identifi-
cation of a single instance or even multiple instances of disparate treat-
ment; rather, its responsibility turns on its own role in producing dispar-
ate treatment within its walls."'' 30 Professor Green, drawing upon the
literature on corporate criminality and organizational studies, urges that
employers be held directly responsible for what the entity itself has done
wrong-encouraging or allowing discrimination to thrive by the entity's
"set of attitudes and positions, which influence, constrain, and at times
even define the modes of thinking and behavior of the people who popu-
late it."''
Instead of asking whether an entity can be held vicariously liable for
negligence in supervising its individual policymakers or employees,'
32
Professor Green's context model would seek to locate wrongdoing at the
127. See supra notes 118-29 and accompanying text. The difficulties identified by scholars
writing in the methodological strand are nicely encapsulated by Professor Selmi in a story he relates
in his contribution to the Working Group:
The role statistics play in systemic discrimination cases has always been a bit of a mys-
tery, a fact that was brought home to me recently at a conference I attended with mostly
philosophers present. During a discussion of the Wal-Mart case, one of the philosophers
asked, rather incredulously, how can statistics prove intent? ... [W]e had a difficult time
providing an answer, other than to point to some of the cases.
Selmi, supra note 4, at 480.
128. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
129. See Green, supra note 2. Professor Green's proposed entity-level conceptualization of
systemic disparate treatment appears to be an idea with which Professors Hart and Ford generally
concur. Hart, supra note 4, at 456 n.2; see Ford, supra note 4, at 513-14 (advancing a "collective
justice" approach to systemic disparate treatment).
130. Green, supra note 2, at 439.
131. Id. at 439 (quoting Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability:
From Adaptation and Imitation Toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 4 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 641, 686 (2000)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
132. As Professor Green observes, "[E]ntity liability for systemic disparate treatment has never
turned on these concepts." Green, supra note 2, at 429.
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entity level. In her words, the context model "asks whether the entity is
producing wrongdoing on an aggregate basis within its walls rather than
asking exclusively whether an identifiable high-level policy maker or
low-level decision maker acted with purpose or intent to harm or whether
the entity has done enough to police wrongdoing of individual actors."'
' 33
Professor Green's proposal of a contextual model is an important
step in systemic disparate treatment scholarship. By drawing upon stud-
ies of organizational dynamics, the contextual model appropriately rec-
ognizes that organizations can produce disparate treatment within the
organization even though it may be "difficult to isolate identifiable
wrongdoers."'34 The Wal-Mart case itself may present an example of
such a situation. There, Walmart left promotion decisions to the subjec-
tive discretion of store managers. 135 The plaintiffs alleged that this decen-
tralized, discretionary promotion policy resulted in discrimination against
female employees in the aggregate at Walmart stores across the coun-
try. 136 When each individual promotion decision in a case like Wal-Mart
is examined in isolation it may not be possible to affirmatively identify a
definitive instance of intentional disparate treatment discrimination. Yet,
social science evidence suggests that an observed company-wide dispari-
ty in promotion outcomes may nonetheless be caused by certain organi-
zational influences, attitudes, and cultures that "creat[e] the environment
in which interactions and decisions take place."'
' 37
Professor Green's approach places a focus on understanding the
causal relationship between organizational dynamics and employment
outcomes, but it does not tackle the fundamental problems of inference
highlighted by the ongoing debate in the methodological strand. In her
context model of systemic disparate treatment, Professor Green would
determine liability by "ask[ing] whether the entity is producing wrongdo-
ing on an aggregate basis within its walls," but Professor Green would
appear to accept statistically significant results from binomial distribu-
tions and multiple regression analyses to answer that question.138 She
argues that "[s]tatistics serve as evidence of regular, widespread internal
disparate treatment."'139 Professor Green explains her view of the power
133. Id. at 398-99. Professor Selmi would not ascribe to this view if it would go so far as to
impose direct liability on employers for "passively facilitating discrimination" that is not at least
causally connected to the employer's "broader cultural norms within the firm." Selmi, supra note 4,
at 503. Professor Selmi argues that such a conceptualization of systemic disparate treatment "would
come close to requiring employers to implement some form of affirmative action, something no
court is likely to require." Id.
134. Green, supra note 2, at 436.
135. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (201 I).
136. See infra Part II.C (discussing the facts and holding from Wal-Mart).
137. Green, supra note 2, at 440; see also Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title
VII as a Toolfor Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 662-63 (2003).
138. Green, supra note 2, at 398.
139. Id. at 444. Professor Green refers to "sophisticated statistical analyses" that can control for
external factors, an apparent reference to multiple regression. Id.
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of statistical evidence "[s]tatistics cannot tell us whether one would see a
particular observed disparity in the absence of discrimination, but they
can indicate the likelihood that an observed disparity (after accounting
for legitimate variables) is due to chance.'
' 40
Other scholars have made similarly inflated claims about the power
of statistics in systemic discrimination cases to prove the likelihood that
observed disparities are due to chance. Professor Selmi may not fully
endorse Professor Green's contextual model,'41 but he nonetheless ech-
oes her claim about statistical evidence: "In the context of discrimination
claims, that [statistically significant] disparity will generally be attributed
to discrimination since the function of the standard deviation analysis 
to rule out chance fluctuations."142 Professor Michael Zimmer, discuss-
ing binomial distribution analysis in a recent article about Wal-Mart,
states: "If there is a statistically significant relationship between sex and
promotions, that relationship makes it extremely unlikely to be the result
of chance."
143
The foregoing statements all exaggerate, to greater or lesser de-
grees, the power of statistical evidence obtained from binomial distribu-
tion and multiple regression analyses to cast doubt on chance as the like-
ly explanation for observed disparities. Just like the D.C. Circuit in the
passage quoted above in Part II.A, 144 scholars frequently convert statisti-
cal significance into something that it is not. A statistically significant
result does not justify the conclusion that chance can be ruled out as an
explanation for an observed disparity in a particular case, at least not
absent some hidden assumption about background rates of discrimina-
tion.145 Nor can a statistically significant result, in the absence of base
rate information, provide us with a quantified likelihood that observed
disparities are due to chance rather than discrimination.46 To rule out
chance as an unlikely explanation for observed disparities, one must con-
sider the statistical results in light of information or estimates about the
140. Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
141. Selmi, supra note 4, at 503 n.107. Professor Selmi would require that the disparate em-
ployment outcomes are somehow traced to particular employees or at least to "broader cultural
norms within the firm." Id. at 503.
142. Id. at 482 (emphasis added). Likewise, Professor Ford in his contribution to the Working
Group writes: "Of course that [statistical evidence] can be and often is manipulated too, but good
statistical analysis can distinguish real evidence from spin." Ford, supra note 4, at 521. Ford explains
that as sample sizes increase, the "potential for chance to affect the analysis" decreases. Id. This is a
recognition that large sample sizes tend to more easily produce statistically significant binomial
distribution or regression results. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 4.15.
143. Zimmer, supra note 3, at 442 (emphasis added). Professor Zimmer makes a more modest
claim about the results of multiple regression analysis: "Holding all the variables other than sex
constant, the technique shows whether there is a statistically significant relationship between pay and
sex. If there is, the null hypothesis that sex and pay are unrelated should be rejected." Id. at 442-43.
144. See supra text accompanying note 82.
145. See supra Part II.A.3; see also Weiss, supra note 9, at 1746.
146. See supra text accompanying note 87.
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base rate of discrimination. 147 Unfortunately, statistical analysis of obser-
vational data alone, without some hidden assumption about background
rates, cannot "indicate the likelihood that an observed disparity (after
accounting for legitimate variables) is due to chance."'
' 48
Recall that if the background rate of discrimination is assumed to be
1% in the simplified example, then a statistically significant finding at
exactly p-value = .05 would mean that the likelihood is I in 6-or about
17%-that the observed disparity is due to discrimination (true positive)
and 5 in 6-or about 83%-that the observed disparity is due to chance
(false positive). 49 This result patently falls short of truly "rul[ing] out
chance fluctuations."'50 When operating with a 1% base rate assumption,
chance is actually a much more likely explanation for the observed dis-
parity than discrimination. What the statistically significant results do
show, given a 1% base rate assumption, is that it now appears relatively
more likely that the employer in question discriminated (17%) than we
would have estimated without the benefit of the observed statistical evi-
dence of disparity (1%). The statistical showing of a disparity does offer
valuable and probative information that should be considered, but it
simply does not and cannot rule out chance as an explanation for ob-
served disparities. 151
Neither Professor Green nor Professor Selmi, in their contributions
to the Working Group, nor Professor Zimmer, in his separate work on the
substantive implications of Wal-Mart, directly address the methodologi-
cal arguments about the limitations of statistical evidence advanced by
Professors Browne and Greiner. Although authors in both scholarly
strands are trying to make sense of systemic disparate treatment law, the
two scholarly strands have, unfortunately, rarely intersected. The meth-
odological critics focus intently on the limitations of statistical evidence
without addressing legitimate, larger questions about the importance of
organizational influences on observed employment outcomes and the
difficulty of identifying and proving discrimination.152 Yet, the contextu-
alists advocating a more expansive conceptualization of systemic dispar-
ate treatment tend to gloss over the very real limitations of statistical
evidence as a tool for reliably identifying employers that are actually
guilty of "producing disparate treatment within [their] walls."',13 For sys-
147. See supra text accompanying note 87.
148. Green, supra note 2, at 403; see also supra text accompanying note 143.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94.
150. Selmi, supra note 4, at 482.
151. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 78, § 12.8.2.b ("Chance affects the data, not the hypothesis.
With the frequency interpretation of chance, there is no meaningful way to assign a numerical prob-
ability to the null hypothesis.").
152. See supra Part II.A.3-4.
153. See Green, supra note 2, at 439. Interestingly, Professor Ford chalks up general skepti-
cism toward statistical evidence as a product of cognitive bias. See Ford, supra note 4, at 519-20.
Under Professor Green's conceptualization of systemic disparate treatment we would, by the defini-
tion of statistical significance at the .05 level, necessarily expect at least 5% of all employers covered
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temic disparate treatment law to survive as an important tool in the anti-
discrimination toolbox, the important theoretical advancements made in
both strands must be harmonized. With apologies to Professor Zatz, what
systemic disparate treatment really needs is an inclusive rethinking of its
theoretical foundations that incorporates the contributions of both the
methodological critics and the contextualists.
54
C. Wal-Mart: The End of Systemic Disparate Treatment?
Unexplored tensions between the methodologists and the contextu-
alists were manifested in the Wal-Mart decision. Wal-Mart was nominal-
ly a case about the requirements of commonality and typicality under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governing class certification. 55 But
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Wal-Mart has potentially profound
implications for the substantive law of systemic disparate treatment giv-
en the skepticism with which the majority viewed statistical evidence of
observed outcome disparities. 156
Wal-Mart involved claims of discrimination on the basis of sex in
the promotion and pay practices at the giant retail chain. 57 Walmart is
the largest private employer in the United States, and the purported class
seeking Rule 23 certification included about 1.5 million female current
and former Walmart employees.5 8 Plaintiffs claimed that a decentralized
decision-making structure at Walmart led to discrimination against wom-
en.159 Plaintiffs brought claims under both the systemic disparate treat-
ment theory and the disparate impact theory-a point that is somewhat
obscured by the Court's decision.'60 The plaintiffs' theory, as described
by Justice Scalia, was "that a strong and uniform 'corporate culture'
permits bias against women to infect, perhaps subconsciously, the discre-
by antidiscrimination laws to be held liable for "producing disparate treatment within [their] walls"
based on a finding of statistically significant outcome disparities. See Green, supra note 2, at 439.
This is true because, assuming that decisions were made at random, by chance alone we would
expect to observe such statistically significant disparities at a rate of 5%, regardless of the number of
covered employers that, in truth, are guilty of unlawful discrimination.
154. Cf Zatz, supra note 2, at 391 ("What systemic disparate treatment theory needs is an
account that grounds employer liability in firm-level conduct-the connective tissue-[]not simply
in dispersed individual disparate treatment, and does so without relying exclusively on the extreme
case of connective disparate treatment.").
155. To the extent that Wal-Mart is truly limited to application of Rule 23, it should have no
bearing on systemic disparate treatment actions brought by the EEOC on behalf of groups of ag-
grieved persons. EEOC pattern or practice claims are not governed by the class certification re-
quirements of Rule 23. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 327 (1980).
156. Green, supra note 2, at 405. Professor Green states:
If the Supreme Court continues down the path set by the majority opinion in Wat-Mart
and adopts an individualistic theoretical foundation for systemic disparate treatment
law ... the Court's 'procedural' decision will result in drastic change in the substantive
law of systemic disparate treatment as it has been practiced for more than three decades.
Id.
157. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2548.
160. Green, supra note 2, at 407 n.45.
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tionary decisionmaking of each one of Walmart's thousands of manag-
ers,,161
The district court certified the proposed class under Rule 23(b)(2),
and a divided en banc Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the certi-
fication. 62 A majority of the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the
Rule 23 requirement of commonality had not been met.163 The Court,
relying heavily on General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,
164
determined that commonality in a case like this could be shown in one of
two ways: (1) where the purported class members were subjected to the
same biased testing procedure for purposes of evaluation by the employ-
er; or (2) where the plaintiffs could show "[s]ignificant proof that an em-
ployer operated under a general policy of discrimination" it might be
conceivable to have a broad class including both applicants for hire and
incumbent employees who are denied promotion. 165
From this, the Court reasoned that commonality was lacking be-
cause plaintiffs had adduced no "'significant proof that Walmart 'oper-
ated under a general policy of discrimination,"' as the majority thought
the Falcon Court's second prong demanded.166 Instead, the Court thought
there was evidence of the opposite, finding it significant that "Wal-
Mart's announced policy forbids sex discrimination.'67 In a revealing
passage, the Court explained why commonality must be lacking in
Walmart's decentralized decision-making system:
[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any corporation-and
surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimina-
tion-would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring
and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all. Others
may choose to reward various attributes that produce disparate im-
pact-such as scores on general aptitude tests or educational
achievements. And still other managers may be guilty of intentional
161. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2548.
162. Id. at 2549.
163. Id. at 2556-57.
164. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
165. Id. at 159 n.15. The Falcon case was focused on the question whether, given Rule 23's
commonality and typicality requirements, a single class under Rule 23 could include two separate
groups of individuals: (1) those who were denied hire by the defendant, and (2) those who were
denied promotion by the defendant. Id.; see also Green, supra note 2, at 410. In the early develop-
ment of systemic disparate treatment law, cases would often proceed as "across the board" discrimi-
nation cases, where the class of aggrieved individuals would include combinations of different
protected groups and combinations of different adverse employment actions (such as failure to hire,
failure to promote, and termination). Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions
Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813, 818 (2004).
166. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15). The first prong of
Falcon was inapplicable, because the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart did not allege that they were subjected
to any biased uniform testing procedure or evaluation method. Id.
167. Id. Importantly, the defendant in Hazelwood had a similar official policy of non-
discrimination, providing that the School District would "hire all teachers on the basis of training,
preparation and recommendations, regardless of race, color or creed." Hazelwood Sch, Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 303 04 (1977).
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discrimination that produces a sex-based disparity. In such a compa-
ny, demonstrating the invalidity of one manger's use of discretion
will do nothing to demonstrate the invalidity of another's. 1
68
Professor Green rightly notes that Justice Scalia's majority opinion
appeared to embrace a policy-required view of the systemic disparate
treatment theory, representing a break with the Court's precedent.'
69
Nothing in Teamsters or Hazelwood required the plaintiffs to identify a
specific policy or a specific individual decision-maker that caused the
observed disparity. Rather, the Court in Hazelwood plainly allowed sta-
tistical evidence of a gross disparity alone to establish a prima facie case
of systemic disparate treatment discrimination without requiring the
plaintiff to single out any particular policy or mechanism responsible for
generating the observed disparity.1 70 Identifying a particular employment
practice or policy leading to a disparity is required in disparate impact
cases,17 1 but until Wal-Mart, it had never been required in systemic dis-
parate treatment cases.'72
The Wal-Mart opinion nicely highlights a tension between the two
scholarly strands. On a contextual view, the Wal-Mart plaintiffs estab-
lished all that was necessary to show that Walmart was producing dis-
parate treatment within its walls-statistically significant employment
outcome disparities. Under Professor Green's model, this would be suffi-
cient to hold Wal-Mart directly liable for its own entity-level wrongdo-
ing. The various differences between class claimants, including their
store location, their supervisors, their managers, their job duties, and so
on, would be entirely irrelevant to this determination, making class certi-
fication appropriate. Methodological scholars criticizing overreliance on
tests of statistical significance, however, would likely reach exactly the
opposite conclusion. For scholars like Professor Browne, the statistically
significant results of traditional statistical techniques, without something
more, would not be sufficient to justify an inference of disparate treat-
ment. The Wal-Mart majority appears to have sided with the methodo-
logical critics. Justice Scalia demanded more than just statistical evi-
168. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
169. Green, supra note 2, at 408, 410; see also Selmi, supra note 4, at 503 (discussing Judge
Ikuta's dissent in the Ninth Circuit's en bane decision).
170. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08 ("Where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they
alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination.").
171. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l)(A)(i) (2012); see
also Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law 5 (2011) (unpublished draft of
Selmi, supra note 4) (on file with author) ("In a disparate impact claim, it is generally possible to
pinpoint a decision-to locate an agent or an explicit policy that is at the center of the allegations,
and it is mostly a specific act.").
172. Green, supra note 2, at 397 (calling the majority's policy-required view a "drastic reshap-
ing of systemic disparate treatment law"); Selmi, supra note 4, at 503 ("This is why many, like
Judge Ikuta of the Ninth Circuit and the late scholar Richard Nagareda, seek a policy or practice as
proof of discrimination, although a formal policy is not required and if there was one it should be
adjudicated under other causes of action." (footnote omitted)).
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dence of a disparity. He required some "glue" to bind the class members'
claims together-evidence of a policy of discrimination, a common
rogue decision-maker, or perhaps anecdotal evidence on a much larger
scale.73 As demonstrated below, the majority's demand for some "glue"
binding together the class members' claims reflects a change in the
Court's hidden priors from Teamsters to Wal-Mart.
III. THE BAYESIAN PATH FORWARD
"Bayesian theory is a way of systematizing the elementary point that
preconceptions play a role in rational thought. "'74
Can systemic disparate treatment law survive Wal-Mart? If, as Pro-
fessor Green argues, Wal-Mart represents a substantive shift to a new,
policy-required view of systemic disparate treatment law, then the proof
framework elucidated in Teamsters and Hazelwood is no more. This Part
argues, however, that there is a viable path forward for systemic dispar-
ate treatment law that explains the outcome in Wal-Mart and that can
also successfully reconcile some of the key concepts advanced by meth-
odologists and contextualists. That path will require courts to embrace a
Bayesian view of statistical evidence that acknowledges the importance
of preconceptions.
A. Bayesian Inference
Recall the simplified base rate examples set forth in Part II.A. In the
base rate examples, we see that when identical statistical evidence is
viewed in the context of two different base rate assumptions, we arrive at
very different likelihoods that the defendant discriminated.'7 5 This out-
come is explained by the operation of Bayes' Theorem. Bayes' Theorem
describes in mathematical terms how a decision-maker can rationally
process new information-here, an observed disparity in employment
outcomes-by combining it with the decision-maker's prior knowledge
or belief-here, the assumed base rate of discrimination-and use the
end result (usually called a "posterior probability") to make a decision
under uncertainty.176 In a Bayesian model of discrimination analysis the
173. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552.
174. POSNER, supra note 10, at 67. Judge Posner later substitutes the term "Bayesian priors"
for the term "preconceptions," given the pejorative connotation associated with the word "precon-
ception." Id.
175. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
176. How a judge or jury processes information received in the form of pleadings, testimonial
evidence, documentary evidence, or statistical evidence is the subject of a continuing debate in
evidence literature. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, in PROBABILITY
AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES AND LIMITS OF BAYESIANISM 21, 43 (Peter
Tillers & Eric D. Green eds., 1988) (arguing that juries engage in a "relative plausibility" analysis, in
which they choose from competing, but fully specified, alternative stories by deciding which story
best explains the evidence). Some scholars suggest that a relative plausibility model is not necessari-
ly inconsistent with Bayesian processing. Peter Tillers, Trial By Mathematics-Reconsidered, 10
LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 167, 170 (2011) ("[1]t was a mistake [for critics of trial by mathematics]
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decision-maker begins by assigning some prior probability distribution to
the question at issue and then updates that probability distribution with
observed information about employment outcome disparities.
The calculations are generally more complex in Bayesian statistical
analysis than in the traditional analyses described above, but several au-
thors have provided examples in the discrimination context.,77 Professor
Ramona Paetzold succinctly illustrates Bayesian inference with the fol-
lowing example. Imagine an employer makes twenty new hires, six of
whom were women and fourteen of whom were men, even though the
employer drew from a pool of qualified applicants that contained 52%
women and 48% men.178 The question is: should an inference of discrim-
ination arise from this evidence outcome disparity? The answer likely
depends on the decision-maker's priors, or preconceptions about the like-
lihood that the employer discriminated, before viewing the observed sta-
tistical data.
A Bayesian analyst begins by assigning a prior probability distribu-
tion.179 In Professor Paetzold's example, she first assumes that the deci-
sion-maker assigns a 0.5 probability to the proposition that the hypothet-
ical employer did not discriminate at all in making hiring decisions (i.e.,
the true chance that any particular hire would be female from the quali-
fied applicant pool was exactly equal to 0.52) and that the remaining 0.5
probability is spread uniformly over all the remaining possible values
(other than 0.52) for the chances that any particular hire would be fe-
male.80 Applying Bayes' Theorem to update the prior in light of the ob-
served disparity, the decision-maker in this case would arrive at a poste-
rior probability of 0.357 that the employer did not discriminate.' 
81
The posterior probability in the foregoing example might still be
sufficient to support an inference of discrimination, but it is sensitive to
changes in the prior. If the assigned prior probability distribution is
changed-either by building in a higher or lower probability that the
employer did not discriminate or by changing how the remaining proba-
bility is distributed among the possible values for the true chance that
any particular hire would be female-then the posterior outcome chang-
es. Where the observed disparity in employment outcomes is not over-
to suppose that storytelling is inconsistent with Bayesian or mathematical analysis of evidence with
cardinal numbers .... (footnote omitted)).
177. See, e.g., Paetzold, supra note 56, at 406-07; David Kaye, Statistical Evidence of Dis-
crimination, 77 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 773, 779 (1982).
178. Paetzold, supra note 56, at 406-07.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 407.
181. Id. at 407 n.59 (providing the Bayesian calculation). Based on the assumed prior distribu-
tion, combined with the observed data reflecting an employment outcome disparity, the decision-
maker would estimate that there is approximately a 64% chance that the employer discriminated in
the hiring process, and approximately a 36% chance that the employer did not discriminate. Id. at
407.
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whelming, the effects of varying the assigned prior can be dramatic. As
Professor Paetzold notes, it is possible for traditional statistical analysis
and Bayesian analysis of the same data to reach diametrically opposite
conclusions about whether an employer likely discriminated.182 A tradi-
tional statistical analysis of a given data set might yield a statistically
significant result with a p-value of .05, while a Bayesian analysis of that
very same data might (depending on priors) yield a posterior probability
that the employer did not discriminate of 0.95.83
As the foregoing illustrates, estimates of priors can make the differ-
ence between deciding that a defendant more likely than not engaged in
systemic disparate treatment and deciding exactly the opposite, even
where the parties offer the exact same statistical evidence. Recognition
of the limitations on indirect statistical inference, the base rate problem,
and the role of prior probability estimates is critical to understanding the
evolution of systemic disparate treatment theory from Teamsters and
Hazelwood through Wal-Mart. The future of systemic disparate treat-
ment law depends on courts and scholars recognizing this fundamental
problem and developing a theoretically sound way of managing it. To
begin this task first requires a brief introduction to a long-running philo-
sophical debate in the field of statistics.
B. The Bayesian/Frequentist Divide
The problem of assigning a prior probability distribution, which will
necessarily be at least somewhat subjective and possibly deeply uncer-
tain, is the primary criticism of the Bayesian-or subjectivist-
philosophy of statistical analysis.'84 Another school of statistical thought,
frequentism-or objectivism-represents the more traditional approach
to statistical inference.'s5 A full discussion of the contours of the fre-
quentist-Bayesian divide is beyond the scope of this Article; however, a
short introduction to this philosophical debate is in order before examin-
182. Id. at 396-97 (citing Dennis V. Lindley, A Statistical Paradox, 44 BIOMETRIKA 187
(1957)).
183. Id. at 408.
184. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 12.05 (noting that traditional frequentist
methods are often thought to be more objective than Bayesian methods because "they appear to rely
on the sample evidence alone, without the inclusion of prior probabilities"); see also MICHAEL J.
ZIMMER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: SELECTED CASES AND STATUTES-2011 47 (Supp.
2011); Mikel Aickin, Issues and Methods in Discrimination Statistics, in STATISTICAL METHODS IN
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 159, 163 (D. H. Kaye & Mikel Aickin eds., 1986) ("Satisfactory rules
for formulating such 'prior' probabilities are not well-developed, and it is far from clear that people
do, or should, formulate and use them in the 'Bayesian' fashion stipulated by subjectivists,").
185. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 12.01 (describing the "traditional school of
thought in statistics" as "based on frequentist notions of probability"); Aickin, supra note 183, at 161
("Speaking very roughly, most statisticians can be categorized with regard to their attitudes towards
probability as being eitherfrequentists or subjectivists."); Rory Bahadur, The Scientific Impossibility
of Plausibility, 90 NEB. L. REV. 435, 457 (2011) ("The two main philosophies of probability theory
are the Frequentist and Bayesian models of probability.").
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ing how courts can manage the role of Bayesian priors in systemic dis-
parate treatment cases.
The frequentist view eschews the notion of specifying prior proba-
bilities altogether.'86 Instead, the frequentist looks at the statistical data
merely as evidence in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis without at-
taching any particular probability to the likelihood that the employer in
this particular case actually discriminated when it made its hiring deci-
sions. A frequentist finding a gender disparity statistically significant at
the .05 level might believe the statistical evidence is sufficient reason to
reject the null hypothesis that employers hire from the labor pool at ran-
dom with respect to gender.'87 But the frequentist does not form any spe-
cific opinion about the likelihood that this employer, during this particu-
lar set of hiring decisions, acted discriminatorily. Instead, the frequentist
rejects the null hypothesis using the following predictive logic:
[T]o say that an event [here, random hiring leading to the observed
disparity by chance] has probability 0.05 is not so much a statement
about any particular occurrence or nonoccurrence of the event, but is
rather a prediction about future repetitions of the setting in which the
• .188
event might occur.
In other words, the frequentist imagines an infinite repetition of the
set of hiring decisions and determines the frequency with which random
hiring would lead to the observed disparate result. This frequentist view
of statistics appears, at least initially, to be more objective than the
Bayesian view because it does not require the decision-maker to specify
and employ a subjective, uncertain, or imprecise prior probability.
The frequentist critique of Bayesianism holds force for settings
where experiments can be repeated many times, especially when using
experimental conditions rather than observational data, but the critique is
less potent in the context of judicial decision-making. A judge or jury
must make a ruling based on the evidence presented in the single case
before it, and does not have the luxury of repeating a hypothetical hiring
process or a controlled hiring experiment many times over to observe a
multitude of outcomes.89 Thus, some scholars, including Professor Rory
186. See infra text accompanying notes 195-96.
187. See Paetzold, supra note 56, at 399-400.
188. Aickin, supra note 184, at 162 (second emphasis added); see also KAYE ET AL., supra
note 78, § 12.8.2.b. ("With the frequency interpretation of chance, there is no meaningful way to
assign a numerical probability to the null hypothesis."); Paetzold, supra note 56, at 401 ("It should
be noted that this traditional method of testing is referred to as the 'frequentist' method of testing
because the p-value r presents a 'long-run frequency' interpretation of probability .... In order for
the probability to be accurately interpreted, it must be possible to conceive of an infinite number of
relevant, nearly identical hiring decisions facing the employer.").
189. Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches and the Legal Con-
sumption of Scientific Evidence, 97 MICH. L. REV. 931, 969 (1999) ("[T]he classical statistical meth-
od seeks to ascertain recurrent patterns, using observations about occurrences in the past to predict
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Bahadur and Professor Ramona Paetzold, have argued that Bayesian
reasoning is the better way to view statistical proof in the courtroom.
Professor Bahadur argues:
Frequentist models are ill-suited for use in the legal system because
they involve computing probability in idealized, non-real-world con-
texts, and they are incapable of incorporating preexisting information
into the decision process .... Bayesian probability analysis, by con-
trast, is an approach to statistics which "formally seeks to utilize prior
information." ... Bayesian probability, like legal inference, essential-
ly seeks to process information in a manner that yields the most op-
timal inferences based on the information.
190
Likewise, Professor Paetzold has argued for a switch from fre-
quentism to Bayesianism in the specific context of employment discrim-
ination cases.'9 1 She notes that the information provided by frequentist
statistical methods, including testing the null hypothesis of random hiring
decisions, is so "at odds" with the purpose of a judicial proceeding that it
leads to confusion and error, including the transposition fallacy.192 Pro-
fessor Paetzold writes:
In order for the ... [p-value from frequentist analysis] to be accurate-
ly interpreted, it must be possible to conceive of an infinite number
of relevant, nearly identical hiring decisions facing the employer. In
other words, the frequentist approach requires consideration of hypo-
thetical evidence (i.e., hypothetical hiring decisions) that were not ac-
tually a part of the employer's past hiring practices. The correct in-
terpretation of p-values is sufficiently at odds with the factfinder's
needs that courts often have difficulty in interpreting the statistical
evidence.
193
Although many statisticians can generally be categorized as fre-
quentist or Bayesian in their philosophies, some take a more nuanced
view by using "whichever approach seems to be appropriate to the nature
of the problem at hand."'' 94 The Bayesian approach seems especially apt
in systemic disparate treatment cases in light of the base rate and causal
inference problems highlighted by the methodological critics. Further,
the frequentist disdain for using subjective prior probabilities is mislead-
ing in the context of judicial decision-making. Making liability decisions
about an individual employer's set of employment actions based on a
frequentist rejection of the null hypothesis necessarily carries with it the
the future.... Adjudication, by contrast, usually seeks to determine the truth about a particular
dispute, which usually concerns events in the past.").
190. Bahadur, supra note 185, at 457-58 (footnotes omitted).
191. Paetzold, supra note 56, at 412 ("There are strong reasons for switching to Bayesian
methods of statistical inference in employment discrimination cases.").
192. Id. at 401.
193. Id. (footnote omitted).
194. Aickin, supra note 184, at 162.
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use of an implied, hidden prior probability. The following subparts illus-
trate the hidden role of Bayesian priors in judicial decision-making in
systemic disparate treatment cases, including Teamsters, Hazelwood, and
Wal Mart.
C. Hidden Priors in Judicial Use ofFrequentist Statistics
Frequentists decry Bayesians' reliance on unknowable, subjective
prior probabilities.'95 But when a decision-maker draws an inference of
discrimination in a particular systemic disparate treatment case based on
a finding of statistical significance at the .05 level, the frequentist en-
courages the use of a built-in, unstated, and unexamined prior probabil-
ity. Courts and juries relying on frequentist statistical significance to shift
the burden of proof or determine liability use built-in priors without real-
izing it. As Professors Paetzold and Willborn explain:
Although traditional methods are often viewed as more objective in
the sense that they appear to rely on the sample evidence alone, with-
out the inclusion of prior probabilities, virtually any inference that a
frequentist makes implies a corresponding Bayesian inference with
respect to some assignment of prior probabilities. In other words, the
traditional approach can be viewed as operating with a built-in set of
prior beliefs. The fact-finder in a discrimination case would arguably
be better served by examining explicitly a wide range of prior beliefs,
for it is only then that the fragility or robustness of the inference
about discrimination can be assessed. 1
96
This point is illustrated by revisiting one of the simplified examples
from Part II.A.3. Assume that a systemic disparate treatment case is
brought against Employer A. In Phase I of the Teamsters framework, the
plaintiffs present statistical evidence in the form of a binomial distribu-
tion analysis of Employer A's hiring patterns. The frequentist statistician
expert testifies that the p-value for the observed disparity in Employer
A's hiring data is exactly .05, making the results just statistically signifi-
cant at the .05 level. Recall that the correct interpretation of this statisti-
cal finding is as follows: Assuming that Employer A hired randomly
from the relevant labor pool, we would expect to see results showing this
level of disparity only 5 times in every 100-or I in 20-repetitions of
the hiring process. Assume that no other evidence is offered by either
plaintiffs or Employer A. From this statistical evidence alone, the fact-
finder determines in Phase I that Employer A more likely than not en-
gaged in an unlawful pattern or practice of discrimination, and Employer
A is therefore liable for a systemic violation of Title VII. Such a finding
195. See, e.g., Samuel R. Lucas, The Road to Hell...: The Statistics Proposal as the Final
Solution to the Sovereign's Human Rights Question, 30 Wis. INT'L L.J. 259, 319-20 (2012).
196. PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 12.05 (footnotes omitted). As Paetzold and
Willbom note, this is a point that commentators often miss when dismissing Bayesian methods. Id. §
12.05 n.2.
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appears to be justified, and possibly even prescribed, by the Court's
opinion in Hazelwood. Per Teamsters, this finding in Phase I has the ef-
fect of establishing Employer A's wrongdoing, justifying prospective
relief, and shifting the burden of proof to Employer A for Phase II, in
which individual relief for the class members will be considered.
By drawing this inference of systemic discrimination and imposing
liability at Phase I from only the frequentist statistical proof presented,
the fact-finder has actually applied a built-in Bayesian prior probability
without realizing or acknowledging as much. The fact-finder in this sim-
plified example has implicitly assumed that the prior probability of dis-
crimination must be greater than 5%. At a base rate of exactly 5% dis-
crimination, with an observed statistical disparity having a p-value of
.05, one would expect exactly 5 true positives and 5 false positives when
performing the statistical test on 100 employers. A fact-finder consider-
ing this statistical evidence under a 5% base rate assumption would
therefore believe the evidence to be precisely in equipoise as to whether
Employer A engaged in an unlawful pattern or practice of discrimination.
It is exactly as likely that the defendant before the fact-finder is one of
the true positives as it is one of the false positives. Given that plaintiffs
bear the initial burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of unlawful discrimi-
nation,97 the fact-finder should find in favor of Employer A if it believed
the base rate to be exactly 5% or less.'98 But if the fact-finder assumed
any base rate of discrimination higher than 5%, it would find that plain-
tiffs succeeded in showing that it is more likely than not that Employer A
engaged in unlawful discrimination.
By determining that Employer A engaged in systemic discrimina-
tion based on only the statistical evidence with a p-value of .05, the fact-
finder in this simplified example has implicitly assumed a base rate of
discrimination exceeding 5%. It may well be that assuming a base rate of
systemic discrimination higher than 5% is justified, but this point is nev-
er considered by the litigants, the statistical experts, the court, or the fact-
finder. Instead, the implied prior probability assumption is obscured-
hidden within the steps of indirect logical inferences drawn from the
statistics. The frequentist interpretation of statistical probability, at least
as it has been applied by courts in systemic discrimination cases, is no
197. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977).
198. This analysis would be complicated if the inquiry involved not just consideration of
whether the employer more probably than not engaged in unlawful discrimination. I have previously
argued elsewhere that because the systemic disparate treatment theory is fundamentally a burden
allocation scheme, at least as to recovery for individual class members, the parties' relative access to
information should also be considered in Phase I. Bent, supra note 16, at 818. The addition of other
factors, such as the parties' information costs, would complicate the formula and change the critical
cutoff number from > 0.5 (representing the preponderance of the evidence) to some higher or lower
figure, but it would not change the fact that hidden priors will play a role in the probability compo-
nent of the analysis.
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less subjective than the Bayesian approach; it just appears that way on
the surface. Such hidden priors have influenced the development of sys-
temic disparate treatment law beginning with Teamsters and Hazelwood
and continuing through Wal-Mart.
D. Hidden Priors in Teamsters and Hazelwood.- The Foundational Flaw
The systemic disparate treatment theory of unlawful discrimination
was first clearly articulated by the Supreme Court in 1977 in Teamsters
and Hazelwood.199 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was still a
relatively new development in the employment landscape, and intention-
al, open discrimination against minorities and women was still preva-
200lent. Professor Selmi, in his contribution to the Working Group, notes
the importance of the era in which these seminal cases were decided:
[I]n the 1970s, it was relatively easy to draw inferences of discrimi-
nation based on statistics, even relatively crude statistics as were of-
fered in Teamsters and Hazelwood. In these early cases, there was
not much of a need to explain the source of the statistical disparity
given that employers routinely discriminated against African Ameri-
cans and women prior to the passage of the 1964 Act, and those hab-
its appeared to die quite slowly.
20 1
In other words, the possibility of intentional discrimination on the
basis of race or gender was an ever-present and obvious potential expla-
nation for observed disparities in hiring, promotion, or other employment
practices. The role of statistics in the early cases, Professor Selmi argues,




Of course, as explained above, the statistics do not eliminate the
possibility that observed disparities were the product of chance. The sta-
tistics do not even necessarily make it more likely than not that the ob-
served disparities were caused by chance. That will depend on the level
of statistical significance (or the p-value) obtained in the statistical analy-
sis, combined with estimated background rates or priors.
Teamsters and Hazelwood were built upon hidden priors. Professor
Selmi is surely correct when he notes: "It was not just the companies'
own history of discrimination that allowed for an inference of discrimi-
nation but it was also the prevalence of discrimination at the time."20 3 As
he puts it, the foundational cases "were of a particular era" and "social
conditions have surely changed.
204
199. See supra Part I.
200. Selmi, supra note 4, at 485-86.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 487.
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This observation reveals the importance of prior probabilities oper-
ating beneath the surface in the foundational cases. The prevalence of
discrimination at the time Teamsters and Hazelwood were decided gen-
erally influenced estimates or preconceptions about how likely it was that
any given employer was engaged in unlawful discrimination, before any
consideration of other evidence in the case. Statistical showings in cases
like Hazelwood had to be considered in the context, and against the
backdrop, of those prior beliefs about the background rates, or preva-
lence, of employment discrimination. As Professor Selmi points out,
once a statistically significant disparity was shown, and if an employer
could not convince the court of some alternative explanation for the ob-
served skew in hiring numbers, the Court was prepared to accept the next
205most obvious explanation at that time: intentional disparate treatment°.
Unsurprisingly, the Court did not openly discuss prior probabilities
or base rates of discrimination in Teamsters or Hazelwood. In both cases,
the Court appears to begin with an unstated assumption that the base rate
of intentional discrimination was relatively high; hence, discrimination
becomes the obvious explanation for observing statistically significant
hiring disparities.20 6 The very structure that the Teamsters opinion pre-
scribes for analyzing systemic disparate treatment cases is underpinned
by an unstated prior belief that sufficient baseline levels of discrimina-
tion existed to make discrimination a reasonable explanation in the face
of statistically significant disparities. In Hazelwood, the Court reinforced
that notion, reflecting a similar, unstated prior baseline belief °20 7 The
theoretical and statistical foundations of systemic disparate treatment law
were flawed from the beginning because of the Court's failure to recog-
nize the hidden role of priors. Unstated prior probabilities have been ly-
ing beneath the surface of systemic disparate treatment law since 1977.
E. Hidden Priors in Wal-Mart: How Changing Priors Changed Substan-
tive Doctrine
Professor Suzanna Sherry argues that shifts in the Supreme Court's
"intuitions about how the world works," or to use her term, "foundational
facts," can result in shifting legal doctrine even where the Court denies
that a doctrinal shift has occurred.20 8 This sort of shift in foundational
facts is precisely what occurred in Wal-Mart. The Court's changing in-
tuitions about the background likelihood of discrimination led it to apply
systemic disparate treatment doctrine in ways that threaten to undercut
Teamsters and Hazelwood entirely.
205. See id. at 485-87.
206. See supra text accompanying note 202.
207. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-09 (1977).
208. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 145,
146-47 (2011).
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Why did the Wal-Mart Court demand more of plaintiffs than it did
in Teamsters or Hazelwood for an inference of systemic discrimina-
tion?20 9 Professor Selmi contends that discrimination has become a less
obvious explanation for observed statistical disparities than it was in the
1970s and much of the 1980s.2 He notes:
[O]nce we moved farther away from the era of plain and open exclu-
sionary policies, it has become less clear, at least to the courts, that
discrimination provides the best explanation for the observed dispari-
ties. Importantly, while social conditions have surely changed, the
theory underlying the pattern or practice cause of action has not, and
indeed, the mid-1970s cases of Teamsters and Hazelwood remain
surprisingly relevant today.
211
Neither Professor Selmi nor the Court refers expressly to changes in
Bayesian prior probabilities-no doubt because the Bayesian view of
statistical inference has not been widely accepted in employment dis-
crimination law21 2 and because the hidden priors are buried beneath fre-
quentist inferential reasoning.213 But Professor Selmi's basic point can be
recast in Bayesian terms: the prior probability of discrimination, or the
base rate against which the observed statistical disparity should be
judged, has significantly declined since the 1970s. The estimated back-
ground likelihood that any particular employer is engaged in systemic
discrimination has declined enough to make it "less clear" that "discrim-
ination [always] provides the best explanation for the observed dispari-
ties.2 14
Glimpses of changed priors can be observed by comparing language
in Wal-Mart to language found in the early cases. As Professor Deborah
Weiss notes, Justice Scalia's ruminations about what "most managers in
any corporation" would do are particularly revealing.215 One can certain-
ly question the empirical accuracy of Justice Scalia's assertion that most
managers, if left to their own devices, would choose "sex-neutral, per-
formance-based criteria" to evaluate employees,216 but there can be little
doubt that the same statement would not likely have appeared in a Su-
209. On this point, it may be argued that Wal-Mart did not speak directly to the substance of
systemic disparate treatment law, but only to the procedural question involving Rule 23. But given
that most systemic disparate treatment claims (other than those filed by the EEOC) are brought as
class actions under Rule 23, and that the merits inquiry often merges with the certification inquiry, it
may make little difference. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 480, 493.
210. Id. at 487.
211. Id.
212. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 12.01 ("One increasingly popular school of
statistical inference is the Bayesian school. Although the school is well-known among statisticians
and some social scientists, it is only marginally recognized at law.").
213. See supra Part 11.B.
214. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 487.
215. Weiss, supra note 9, at 1687, 1741; see also supra text accompanying note 172 (quoting
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011)).
216. See supra text accompanying note 172 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554).
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preme Court opinion in 1977. Whether Scalia's unsupported observation
is accurate or not, it is reasonable to presume that it is at least closer to a
true statement about intentional discrimination now than it would have
been if the same words had been written in 1977. Justice Scalia's unsup-
ported assertion reflects his intuition about how the world works, and his
intuition is that discrimination is not common.17
Further evidence of changed priors can be found in the importance
that the majority places on Walmart's official policy of non-
discrimination, as compared to its treatment of a similar School District
policy in Hazelwood. The Wal-Mart majority noted: "Wal-Mart's an-
nounced policy forbids sex discrimination, and as the District Court rec-
ognized the company imposes penalties for denials of equal employment
opportunity.' ' 218 As described above, the Wal-Mart majority believed this
official company policy prohibiting discrimination undermined the
commonality requirement because individual managers would not likely
have discriminated in the face of the official policy.
219
Contrast this to Hazelwood. There, the Hazelwood School District
had an "officially promulgated policy 'to hire all teachers on the basis of
training, preparation and recommendations, regardless of race, color or
creed.' 220 Yet, this evidence did not appear to affect the Court's assess-
ment of the requirements for a prima facie showing of systemic disparate
treatment in the slightest. After mentioning the existence of this policy,
the Court focused exclusively on the relative merits of the statistical
showing.221 The Court devoted substantial attention to identifying the
proper comparison labor pool-or reference class-for purposes of con-
ducting a binomial distribution222 and to considering whether hiring dis-
crimination taking place before Title VII prohibited public employers
from discriminating might have affected observed isparities. 22 But no-
where did the Hazelwood Court suggest that the government would need
to identify particular rogue decision-makers who allegedly acted discrim-
inatorily in contravention of the official non-discrimination policy.
224
Rather, the Court made clear that statistical evidence of gross disparity
alone may "in a proper case" constitute a prima facie showing of a pat-
tern or practice of discrimination-apparently in spite of an express non-
discrimination policy.
225
217. See Weiss, supra note 9, at 1687.
218. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (citation omitted).
219. Id. at 2554.
220. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 303-04 (1977).
221. Id. at 306 12.
222. Id. at 308, 311-12.
223. Id. at 309, 309 n.15.
224. See id. at 306-13.
225. Id. at 307-08.
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Finally, the Court in Wal-Mart played up the importance of anecdo-
tal evidence of discrimination in systemic discrimination cases. While
Hazelwood indicated that statistical evidence alone could in a proper case
establish a prima facie case of systemic discrimination, 226 the Wal-Mart
ruling appears to call that statement into question. Justice Scalia points
out the weaknesses of the anecdotal evidence offered by plaintiffs:
In Teamsters v. United States, in addition to substantial statistical ev-
idence of company-wide discrimination, the Government (as plain-
tiff) produced about 40 specific accounts of racial discrimination
from particular individuals. That number was significant because the
company involved had only 6,472 employees, of whom 571 were
minorities, and the class itself consisted of around 334 persons[.] The
40 anecdotes thus represented roughly one account for every eight
members of the class .... Here, by contrast, respondents filed some
120 affidavits reporting experiences of discrimination-about 1 for
every 12,500 class members-relating to only some 235 out of Wal-
Mart's 3,400 stores .... Even if every single one of these accounts is
true, that would not demonstrate that the entire company "operate[s]• .•,,227
under a general policy of discrimination.
Traditionally, a prima facie case of systemic disparate treatment has
"relied almost entirely on statistics."228 According to Professor Selmi, the
"anecdotal evidence is always of marginal significance in a pattern or
practice claim., 229 Although the Teamsters Court highlighted the anecdo-
tal evidence that "brought the cold numbers convincingly to life, 230 that
anecdotal evidence did not appear to be dispositive and the Court in Ha-
zelwood clarified that statistical evidence alone could be sufficient.3
One potential reading of Wal-Mart is that it has changed the substantive
law of systemic disparate treatment such that some "significant" or suffi-
cient level of anecdotal evidence is now required to explain what is going
on in the observed statistical disparity.232
The Court now seems less willing to infer systemic discrimination
on the basis of only statistical evidence of an observed company-wide,
statistically significant disparity in hiring, promotions, or pay, without
something more-the identification of a particular policy, mechanism, or
rogue decision-maker that produces the observed disparity. The Court's
226. Id.
227. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982)). Justice
Scalia also notes that in Teamsters the forty anecdotes came from employees "spread throughout"
the company. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
228. Selmi, supra note 4, at 485.
229. Id. at 501.
230. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
231. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08; see also supra note 43 (listing lower court decisions
stating that statistical evidence alone may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of systemic
disparate treatment discrimination).
232. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
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intuitions about the way the world works-or its hidden Bayesian pri-
ors-appear to have changed.33 Statistically significant evidence sug-
gesting a rejection of the null hypothesis alone was not enough for the
Wal-Mart Court to endorse the inferential leap to discrimination as the
next most obvious explanation for observed disparities.34 Instead, the
Court looked harder for other potential explanations for observed statisti-
cally significant disparities.235 After Wal-Mart, the Court may demand
evidence of a policy of discrimination, or at least some story or narrative
to explain the data, as Professor Selmi suggests. Alternatively, it might
demand some additional pieces of evidence such as a higher volume of
anecdotal testimony to nudge the probability of discrimination over the
line.
The Wal-Mart Court's approach is generally consistent with, and
can be explained by, a Bayesian view of systemic disparate treatment law
with two major caveats: (1) the Wal-Mart Court did not openly
acknowledge the role of prior probabilities, and (2) the Wal-Mart Court
used its own unstated priors, but disregarded social framework evidence
that would have helped a fact-finder form or adjust its own priors. The
majority's unsupported assertion about what most managers would do
was not recognized as a challengeable, and empirically testable, assump-
tion about the non-case-specific background likelihood of discrimina-
236
tion. Yet, the majority cast aside expert testimony on social frame-
works that would have provided valuable information about the back-
ground likelihood of discrimination in certain organizational settings
precisely because the expert was not able to offer case-specific infor-
237
mation.
F. Reconciling the Methodological and Contextualist Strands by Expos-
ing Hidden Priors
As the preceding discussion shows, Bayesian priors are at work in
systemic disparate treatment cases whether courts choose to
233. The idea that the Court's prior estimate of the base rate of discrimination would change
over the course of more than thirty years is generally consistent with statements the Court has made
regarding changing societal attitudes toward racial classifications. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 343 (2003) ("we expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today."); see also Sherry, supra note 208, at 164-65. ("It is
reasonable to suppose, however, that the passage of time might lessen the likelihood that employers
are deliberately discriminating, especially in the context of disparate impact. By the late 1980s, was
it still more likely than not that any employer who adopted an employment practice with a disparate
impact had a covert discriminatory intent? The Court apparently thought not."). Professor Sherry
highlights changes in disparate impact doctrine and individual disparate treatment burden-shifting
doctrine that she contends are attributable to the Court "chang[ing] its mind about the overall preva-
lence of racially discriminatory motives among American employers." Id. at 166.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 169-73.
235. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554-55 (2011).
236. Weiss, supra note 9, at 1687.
237. Id. at 1678.
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acknowledge them or not.238 A Bayesian view of systemic disparate
treatment would expose the role of hidden priors, rebuild the flawed the-
oretical and statistical foundations of the doctrine, and bring coherence to
the most misunderstood category of antidiscrimination claims. Further, a
Bayesian view also holds the potential to reconcile methodological and
contextualist strands of legal scholarship described in Part II.
For critics writing in the methodological strand, use of Bayesian
priors would prevent courts and experts from falling into the transposi-
tion fallacy trap and would focus fact-finders on the conditional probabil-
ity in which they are truly interested-the probability that the employer
unlawfully discriminated, given the observed disparities in employment
outcomes. Professor Browne may remain skeptical of our judicial sys-
tem's ability to generate usable estimates of prior probabilities and con-
vey them in an understandable way, but these are questions about he
source and management of priors. Part IV of this Article identifies some
of these difficult practical questions and proposes a scholarly agenda for
addressing them. For now, it is enough to note that the use of Bayesian
statistics is not unheard-of in litigation, especially in paternity cases and
DNA match criminal cases.239 Despite potential difficulties in implemen-
tation, the introduction of Bayesian logic in systemic disparate treatment
cases is now overdue.
The Bayesian approach also provides conceptual space for the con-
textualist view advanced by Professor Green. The contextualist view
posits that certain organizational or cultural dynamics operating at the
entity-level can generate disparate employment outcomes, even though
individual intentional wrongdoers cannot be identified.240 This is, essen-
tially, an argument that society underperceives the extent and relative
likelihood of employment discrimination because we cannot identify
individual wrongdoers in all cases.241 In formulating this argument, Pro-
fessor Green draws on the work of social scientists studying organiza-
tional behavior.42 Taking a Bayesian approach in the courtroom, those
same social scientists could provide expert testimony about the ways in
which organizational dynamics can and do lead to disparate treatment in
employment outcomes, even where individual intentional wrongdoers are
238. See id. at 1678-79 (contending that the application of priors are unavoidable in discrimi-
nation law generally).
239. See infra Part IV.
240. See supra Part I.B.
241. See Green, supra note 2, at 433. Professor Green states:
As a practical matter, disparate treatment is often difficult to discern on an individual
basis-it occurs subtly in day-to-day interactions, in decisions that do not lend easily to
immediate comparison, and in unstated judgments and perceptions of value and skills-
and therefore can frequently only be identified in the aggregate, where it can be shown
that members of a particular group are being denied more promotions or provided less
pay.
Id. (citation omitted).
242. See supra text accompanying note 138.
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not observed. This expert testimony would help fact-finders estimate
prior probabilities. For example, expert, non-case-specific social frame-
work testimony about organizational causes of discrimination could ap-
propriately adjust the fact-finder's estimates of prior probabilities.
One of the strengths of the Bayesian approach is its ability to incor-
porate newly-learned information in a rational and logically consistent
way by updating probability estimates. This built-in flexibility in the
Bayesian approach provides a distinct advantage over the status quo,
with its more rigid decision rule that turns on a finding of frequentist
statistical significance, and the accompanying doctrinal shifts that occur
periodically as the Supreme Court's hidden priors change over time. If
social scientists make additional breakthroughs in our understanding of
the extent or causes of employment discrimination, that new information
can be conveyed to the fact-finder in the courtroom (and, of course, sub-
jected to challenge and rebuttal by the opposing party). Priors can be
updated accordingly, and statistical evidence can be correctly interpreted
in a way that avoids the transposition fallacy and is consistent with
Bayes' Theorem. In this way, social framework evidence like that of-
fered by Dr. William Bielby in the Wal-Mart case can and should be
used to adjust the fact-finder's priors, even though it is not case-
specific 243
The Bayesian view of systemic disparate treatment law provides a
workable path forward that accommodates the contributions made by
both the methodological critics and the contextualists. It also explains the
doctrinal arc of systemic disparate treatment law from Teamsters to Wal-
Mart. Changing priors have changed the substantive law. Acknowledg-
ing the influence of priors is the first step in developing a coherent theory
of systemic disparate treatment law that accords statistical evidence of
outcome disparities its appropriate weight, yet also incorporates our
changing understandings of how discrimination operates in the work-
force.
IV. A SCHOLARLY AGENDA FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF PRIORS
Acknowledgment of the importance of priors is only the first step in
developing a unified theory of systemic disparate treatment law. A num-
243. Weiss, supra note 9, at 1679 ("Social framework evidence promises to go some way to
replacing the personal views of judges and juries with a more objective perspective."). Social
framework evidence can be relevant even though it is not case-specific, because it provides infor-
mation about potential misperceptions of background rates of discrimination. The Wal-Mart majority
dismissed the social framework testimony offered by plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Bielby, because he
"could not ... determine with any specificity how regularly stereotypes play a meaningful role in
employment decisions at Wal-Mart." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted). Once the role of Bayesian priors is exposed,
however, it becomes clear that Dr. Bielby's testimony was relevant to a proper interpretation of the
observed statistical disparities in employment outcomes, even though he could not offer case-
specific testimony about the true causes of disparity at Wal-Mart specifically. See Weiss, supra note
9, at 1683-87 (noting the relevance, under a Bayesian view, of "pure social framework evidence").
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ber of difficult second-order questions are immediately raised by the
recognition that prior probabilities influence the interpretation of statisti-
cal evidence of outcome disparities. These questions include:
1. Whose priors matter?244 Possible answers include the trial
judge, the trial fact-finder, appellate judges, and the legisla-
ture.
2. Relatedly, how should evaluation of priors fit into civil liti-
gation pretrial procedure, including key dispositive proce-
dures such as motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment?
3. How can Bayesian statistical inference be presented to fact-
finders at trial? Other scholars have discussed possible tech-
niques for conveying Bayesian information to jurors, includ-
ing the use of charts that provide different posterior probabil-
ities for a number of selected possible prior probability dis-
245tributions. Something similar has even been required by at
least one court in the context of Bayesian statistical inference
in the paternity testing context.
2 46
4. What are legitimate or illegitimate sources of priors? Here,
potential answers range from pure unsupported guesses to
empirical evidence on background rates of discrimination to
expert testimony about social framework causes of discrimi-
nation. Which sources are legitimate? Should some sources
receive more deference than others?
In a related paper, I offer my views on these difficult second-order
questions.247 Although these questions pose practical challenges to the
use of Bayesian statistical inference in systemic disparate treatment liti-
gation, they are not intractable. Courts already use Bayesian statistical
inference regularly in some DNA matching and paternity testing cases.248
Some scholars and statisticians have long been optimistic that courts can
adapt to the use of Bayesian statistics in discrimination cases.249
244. Professors Paetzold and Willbom identify this question, but do not attempt an answer. See
PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 12.05 n.10 ("An important legal issue would involve
whose prior probabilities should be represented. Because the Bayesian view of probability is subjec-
tive (represents an individual's uncertainty), courts would need to decide whose uncertainty the prior
distribution should represent.").
245. See, e.g., KAYE ET AL., supra note 78, § 14.3.1 (discussing the potential use of prior
probability charts in DNA match case).
246. Plemel v. Walter, 735 P.2d 1209, 1219 (Or. 1987); see also D.H. Kaye, Plemel as a Pri-
mer on Proving Paternity, 24 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 867, 875-82 (1988).
247. Bent, supra note 14.
248. The following search in the ALLCASES Westlaw database returned 114 results:
(BAYES! or "PRIOR PROBABILIT!" or "PRIOR ODDS") & ("DNA MATCH" or
"PATERNITY"). See also KAYE ET AL., supra note 78, §§ 14.3.1-14.4.3.
249. See, e.g., Stephen E. Fienberg, The Increasing Sophistication of Statistical Assessments as
Evidence in Discrimination Litigation, 77 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N. 784, 784 (1982) ("1 believe that with
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The existence of difficult second-order questions does not counsel
in favor of ignoring prior probabilities. As demonstrated above, when
decision-makers ignore prior probabilities and draw inferences to impose
liability based on frequentist statistical significance they are, in effect,
operating with a hidden, built-in, unexamined prior. The point of this
paper is not to answer all of the difficult second-order questions that
come with acknowledging priors but rather to get the discussion started.
Once courts and scholars come to recognize the inescapable role of prior
probabilities, they can turn their attention to the second-order questions
and develop a more fully-formed system for managing priors in the
courtroom.
CONCLUSION
Wal-Mart represents a substantive move away from the systemic
disparate treatment theory as formulated in Teamsters and Hazelwood.
While evidence of a statistically significant disparity was once sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of systemic disparate treatment, the Wal-
Mart Court demanded more. This Article shows that the Court's substan-
tive doctrinal shift can be explained by recognizing the cracks in the sta-
tistical and theoretical foundations of systemic disparate treatment law
tracing back to 1977. The foundational cases rested on an unstated and
unexamined assumption about prior probabilities that a majority of the
Court seemingly no longer holds. A change in hidden priors has led to a
change in the law.
This Article challenges courts and scholars to openly acknowledge
the importance of priors in evaluating systemic discrimination cases so
that the discussion of the difficult challenges we face in managing priors
can begin. The future shape of systemic disparate treatment law will de-
pend on whether courts make the operation of priors more transparent.
Acknowledging hidden priors will bring together the academic insights
of the methodologists and the contextualists, clearing the way for consid-
eration of the second-order issues of prior management and for the inclu-
sion of social framework and other evidence of organizational causes of
discrimination. Wal-Mart should be viewed not as the death knell for
systemic disparate treatment law but rather as the instigator for a funda-
mental change in how statistical evidence of an outcome disparity is in-
terpreted in antidiscrimination law.
the proper training both statisticians and judges could and should learn to present and understand the
results of a proper Bayesian analysis.").

